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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services
across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage in-
dividual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common
pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of
funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit.
We nd that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run
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1 Introduction
Elections are widely perceived to serve a number of complementary functions. They aggre-
gate preferences, help select better public o¢ cials, and provide incentives for politicians
to act in the interest of the voters they represent (e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
Elections can serve the latter function when the threat of not being re-elected serves as a
motivation for politicians. How this works, both in theory and in practice, is fairly well
understood in the context of a single politician, such as a state governor or a head of
state with executive power. Here, policy decisions can be analyzed as if they were made
unilaterally by one policy maker and elections and the incentives they provide mitigate
the conict of interest between voters and their elected representative. Sometimes when
voters are mistaken about what the right policy is, re-election incentives may force a politi-
cian who knows better to pander to voters instead of pursuing the socially optimal policy
(Maskin and Tirole (2004)), but in most other cases, electoral incentives increase voter
welfare (Besley (2006)).
Much less is known about how these incentives operate at the level of individual legis-
lators elected to serve along side many other legislators in a legislative chamber. Do they
matter and if so, do they help promote socially desirable outcomes? This paper provides
some answers to these questions. We study the e¤ect of electoral incentives on the al-
location of district-specic public services when policy decisions are made by a group of
legislators, each of whom is able to exert some inuence on the nal policy choice and each
of whom is elected to represent the interest of a particular legislative district. We argue
that the nature of the incentive e¤ect of elections is very di¤erent in a world of collective
decision making and distributive politics. The fundamental reason is that distributive pol-
itics is associated with a conict, which is, typically, not present when a (single) politician
is elected by all voters of a state, between what is desired by the voters of each district and
what is optimal for the state as a whole. The source of this conict is that the benets
of government spending can be concentrated to a particular group of voters while the tax
costs are spread more widely across the entire polity. This encourages individual legisla-
tors to bring too much pork-barrel spending home to their district and creates a common
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pool problem. The combined consequence is that total government spending tends to be
too high (Weingast et al. (1981)). The central message of our paper is that elections may
acquire a more sinister role in a world of distributive politics: they may create additional
incentives for legislators to cater to parochial interests in a way that magnies rather than
resolves the underlying common pool problem.
We develop this idea in two steps. First, we study it theoretically in a model of
distributive politics, asymmetric information, and elections. Second, we gather and analyze
data from seven US states on the amount of pork-barrel spending individual legislative
districts receive from the state budget. Our evidence supports the central message of the
paper and shows that re-election incentives magnify the overspending tendency associated
with the common pool problem, but that this e¤ect is smaller in states with a larger
legislature.
We focus on US state legislatures for two reasons. Firstly, many observers argue that
distributive politics plays a prominent role at the state level, where individual legislators
represent geographically dened constituencies (e.g., Chen and Malhotra (2007), Thomp-
son (1986), and the survey by Goodman (2007)). Gosling (1985) provides a particularly
insightful study of the budget process in Wisconsin that clearly demonstrates that state
legislators are both willing and able to inuence the spatial allocation of state spending. By
tracking the state budget from the initial draft through to the nal version, he quanties
the relative inuence of the major political players (various state agencies, the executives
state budget o¢ ce, and the state legislature) on the nal budget allocation. The analysis
shows that state legislators play a critical role in determining the allocation of transfers
to local government units (municipalities, school districts, counties etc.) through relevant
legislation drafted in committees and amended on the oor. In contrast, their inuence on
other, less geographically targeted spending items, is less pronounced. He summarizes his
nding as follows:
Local assistance items are bread and butterof legislatorsmost informed and
politically active constituents. And since each legislator represents at least
one municipality, county, or school district, each has an interest in how local
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assistance proposals a¤ect his jurisdiction. ... Bureaucrats are permitted
to contribute a good proportion of the budget, but when the budgetary deci-
sions involve the big ticket items, especially those a¤ecting local governments
back home, the legislative actors disproportionately shape the nal outcome.
(Gosling, 1985: p. 477)
The second reason for focusing on US state legislatures is the institution of legislative
term limits which exists in some of them. These limits generate the exogenous variation
in the electoral incentives that we use to identify the incentive e¤ect of elections.
This paper is related to two strands of the literature on the political economy of public
spending. The rst strand is the political agency literature on incentive e¤ects of elections
alluded to above. We relate our theoretical work to this literature in section 2. Empirically,
a series of papers have looked for evidence of shirking among US congressmen when re-
election incentives are weak, with somewhat contradictory results (see the survey by Lott
and Davis (1992) and a more recent contribution by Parker and Powers (2002)). The
major challenge in this line of research is to nd variation in re-election incentives that
can be taken as exogenous to the legislators behavior. In their seminal paper, Besley
and Case (1995) propose to use gubernatorial term limits in the US states to identify the
impact of electoral incentives. When a governor enters his last allowed term, his policy
choices no longer a¤ect the re-election probability. This is in contrast to terms after
which he can run for re-election. Using a within-state comparison of governors, Besley
and Case show that governors who can no longer run for re-election allow state taxes to
increase and state spending to drift up. List and Sturm (2006) also use gubernatorial term
limits to demonstrate that state spending on more specic policies, such as environmental
regulation, diverge more from the interests of voters when the governor can no longer
run for re-election. Exploiting a unique dataset on local government corruption in Brazil,
Ferraz and Finan (2011) show that mayors who cannot stand for re-election due to a term
limit tend to be more corrupt.
These empirical papers, as do most of the theoretical literature, assume that policy
is set unilaterally by a governor or a mayor. Taken together they provide evidence of a
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disciplining e¤ect of elections, consistent with the suggestion of the agency literature that
elections improve voter welfare. The major di¤erence between our analysis and these earlier
studies is our focus on collective policy-making by a group of legislators and on electoral
incentives in operation at the level of individual legislators. This demands that we estimate
the ow of money from the state budget to individual legislative districts within a state,
rather than studying aggregate state spending and taxes or corruption. Moreover, the
variation in electoral incentives in our work comes from legislative rather than executive
(either gubernatorial or mayoral) term limits.1
The second strand of literature that this paper contributes to is the literature on
distributive politics, started by Weingast et al. (1981). They demonstrate theoretically
how the common pool problem emerges when the legislatorsobjective function ignores the
cost of the tax imposed on other constituencies. We complement this theory by explicitly
modelling the interaction between legislators and their voters. This allows us to show how
elections provide incentives for overspending and magnify the underlying common pool
problem.
Our study also adds to previous empirical applications of the theory of distributive
politics to US state legislatures, e.g., Crain (1999), Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995; 2001),
Primo (2006) and Chen and Malhorta (2007). These papers analyze aggregate state spend-
ing in order to test the Law of 1/N: the observation made in Weingast et al. (1981) that
the extent of overspending is greater when there are more districts.2 In contrast, we study
transfers from the state budget to individual legislative districts. In this way, we attempt
to measure pork-barrel spending directly and to show that these transfers are a¤ected by
the electoral incentives facing individual legislators in a way that is consistent with the
wide-spread presumption that state legislators actively seek to attract state funds to their
districts and that they are successful in that endeavor. Although our research design does
not allow for a direct test of the Law of 1/N, we explore the fact that the number of
1Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) also use these term limits to estimate the e¤ect of incumbency on
reelection chances.
2The Law of 1/N has been subject to empirical study in other settings as well (Bradbury and Crain
(2001), Baqir (2002), Bradbury and Stephenson (2003), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), and Brooks et al
(2011)). For a critical evaluation of the evidence on the Law of 1/N, see Primo and Snyder (2008).
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districts is systematically related to the incentive e¤ect of elections to bring new evidence
to bear on it.
We now preview our study and its main results in more detail. We begin by build-
ing a theoretical model that embeds a political agency model with repeated elections,
asymmetric information, and term limits within a canonical model of distributive politics.
The purpose of the model is to illustrate the interaction between electoral incentives and
distributive politics and thus guide our empirical investigation.
At the core of the model lies the common pool problem: the voters of each geograph-
ically dened constituency want more spending allocated to their district than what is
socially optimal for the state as a whole. The reason is that the benets of spending are
concentrated geographically while the costs are borne by the population of the entire state.
Legislators di¤er in their ability to bring back spending to the district that they represent
and can serve for at most two terms in o¢ ce.
The model delivers two predictions that guide our empirical investigation. Firstly, it
predicts that spending to a particular legislative district should fall when the legislator
representing it is up against the term limit relative to when this is not the case. We refer
to this as the last-term e¤ect. This is the direct result of the incentives generated by
elections to cater to parochial interests. In this way, elections may exacerbate the common
pool problem and reduce welfare compared to the scenario without elections. While the
incentives of the governor of a (US) state whose constituency is the entire state may be such
that total spending drifts up in the absence of electoral incentives (as shown by Besley and
Case (1995)), our model suggests that these incentives may work in the opposite direction
in the context of distributive politics.
Secondly, the model predicts that the absolute size of the fall in spending during the
last term is (under a mild su¢ cient condition) smaller in states with a larger number of
districts. Hence, a larger legislature dampens rather than magnies the e¤ect of the term
limit. This implies that although electoral incentives aggravate the common pool problem,
they do so to a lesser degree in legislatures with many districts where the common pool
problem is already large. Our test of this prediction can be interpreted as a new test of the
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Law of 1/N because the prediction is a direct consequence of the fact that the overspending
bias is larger in a larger legislature.
The main contribution of the paper is to take these predictions to the data and thus
provide new empirical evidence on the incentive e¤ect of elections and the Law of 1/N. To
do this, we have collected a new dataset covering the period from 1992 to 2005 in seven
US states (Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma and South Dakota).
The dataset contains information on the legislators elected to a states lower chamber from
each legislative district, and on the transfers from the state budget to these districts. The
data on district-specic transfers (loosely referred to as pork-barrel spending) are unique
and constructing these data can be seen as a major contribution of the paper.
Whilst we, as noted above, build on earlier work that use gubernatorial term limits in
the US to study the e¤ect of electoral incentives, we identify the last-term e¤ectdi¤er-
ently. Previous studies estimated the last-term e¤ectby comparing a US state governor in
his last term to himself in earlier terms and to other governors within the same state who
were not in the last term. The latter group contains governors who never reach the term
limit. If voters use elections to select particular types of governors, then governors who
are repeatedly re-elected will di¤er systematically from those who are not. Consequently,
within such a research design, one cannot identify the last-term e¤ectseparately from
the selection e¤ect of elections. The richness of our data enables us to address this issue
and to isolate the selection e¤ect of elections from the incentive e¤ect. We identify the
last-term e¤ectby comparing how the transfers to a particular legislative district change
when its legislator is up against the term limit relative to previous terms served by that
same legislator. In other words, we identify the last-term e¤ect from within-legislator
variation as opposed to within-district (-state, or -municipality) variation.3 This reduces
signicantly the possibility that selection e¤ects or other unobserved factors contaminate
the estimate.
We nd strong evidence that transfers fall when legislators no longer face electoral
incentives or put the other way around that spending is inated when legislators are
3This is to say we identify the incentive e¤ect of elections from regressions with legislator xed e¤ects.
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subject to electoral incentives. On average, total transfers fall by $14 per capita in a
legislators last term relative to transfers secured by the same legislator in earlier terms.
This corresponds to a 3.5 percent fall in spending. This nding that pork-barrel spending
is higher under the pressure from voters is consistent with the conjecture that elections
aggravate the common pool problem of distributive politics. Therefore, this nding is in
the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (2004) who show that accountability to voters can reduce
welfare. Further decomposition of the data reveals that the incentive e¤ect is associated
with Democrats only. We also nd that the last term fall is smaller in states with a larger
legislature and interpret this as indirect evidence of the Law of 1/N in operation.
The rest of the paper in organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the model and
summarize the features that guide our empirical investigation. In section 3, we discuss the
construction of the dataset and present some stylized facts. In section 4, we lay out our
estimation strategy and present the empirical results related to the last-term e¤ect. In
section 5, we present our test of the Law of 1/N. In section 6, we conclude. The appendices
at the end of the paper contain proofs and a detailed description of the dataset.
2 The Model
Most of the existing theoretical literature on the incentive e¤ect of elections and term limits
focuses on situations with a single politician with executive power, such as a governor
or a head of state, rather than on collective decision making.4 The spotlight in this
literature is on how and to what extent elections can resolve the conict of interest between
voters at large and their elected representative. Yet, virtually all scal decisions are made
4See, e.g., Ferejohn (1986), Reed (1994), Besley and Case (1995), List and Sturm (2006) or the overview
in Persson and Tabellini (2000). An exception, however, is Bernhardt et al. (2004). They study the e¤ect
of term limits on the reelection rule in a political agency model with many legislators and distributive
politics. Distributive politics is modeled as a zero sum game where more senior legislators can bring more
pork-barrel home to their district at the expense of more junior legislators. While this formulation captures
experience e¤ects, it does not address the common pool problem underlying the standard conception of
distributive politics and which forms the core of our model. Persson and Tabellini (2000: chapter 10)
in their comparison of presidential and parliamentarian forms of government also combine elements of
electoral accountability with distributive politics but do not consider asymmetric information which is an
indispensable component of our approach.
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collectively by many legislators and often is an environment where distributive politics
is important because the benets of policy decisions can be targeted at voters living in
particular legislative districts while the costs are disbursed more widely over the entire
polity. In particular, this is true for the sample of US state legislatures that we shall study
empirically. This creates an additional conict of interest between what is optimal for the
state as whole and what is optimal for voters in each district.
We build a model of collective decision making in which electoral incentives, term lim-
its, and distributive politics all play major roles and interact. Our approach stresses three
salient features of collective decision making in a stylized state legislature. We follow the
literature on distributive politics, initiated by the seminal work of Weingast et al. (1981),
and assume that state spending is geographically targeted while the tax cost is shared
amongst all districts. Since legislators are elected in particular legislative districts, this
creates an incentive for them to cater to district-specic interests and to ignore the wider
scal implications of their choices. This creates the common pool problem and the ten-
dency for overspending that is at the core of our model. We add to this a conict of interest
between voters in a district and the legislator who represents them. Specically, we assume
that legislators di¤er in their ability to bring back the pork. One interpretation of this is
that legislators must exert e¤ort in the legislative bargaining process to bias spending deci-
sions in favor of their district. Voters would like to be represented by e¤ectivelegislators
who know how to work the legislature to secure services for them, but they cannot observe
these attributes directly before the fact. The second central feature of the model, then,
is that voters use elections as an ex post selection device in their attempt to distinguish
between di¤erent types of legislators. Term limits hamper this endeavor simply because
elections cannot provide incentives for legislators who cannot seek re-election. This creates
the last-term e¤ectthat encapsulates the electoral incentive e¤ect on the allocation of
state funds.
The third feature of the model is the organization of collective decision making within
the legislature. There are two main theoretical approaches to modeling this: The norm
of universalism (e.g., Weingast et al. 1981; Primo and Snyder, 2006; Brooks et al. 2011)
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and legislative bargaining (e.g., Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Baron, 1991; Battaglini and
Coate, 2007). Under the norm of universalism, each legislator decides directly on the
level of spending for his district, expecting that all legislators will support the omnibus
bill needed to nance the overall spending package. Legislative bargaining, on the other
hand, is based on the notion that particular legislators are granted agenda setting pow-
ers and that spending allocations take place within an environment of minimum winning
coalitions. Although Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that the expected utility of a
legislator running for re-election is higher when the legislature follows the norm of uni-
versalism than if politics is based on minimum winning coalitions, the norm can only be
sustained if legislators can somehow commit to it and promise to vote for the omnibus bill
that approves the overall spending level. The legislative bargaining model avoids this com-
mitment problem and is, therefore, game theoretically more satisfactory. This, however,
comes at the cost that the outcome of the legislative process is sensitive to the specic
assumptions one makes about the bargaining process. Since these details the identity of
the agenda setter, the legislators in the minimum winning coalition etc. at least in our
setting, are hard to quantify empirically and thus to build into our empirical specication,
this makes the legislative bargaining model less useful for our purposes.5 For this reason,
but also for reasons of tractability and to make the results directly comparable to those in
the literature on distributive politics, we maintain the notion that legislators can inuence
the spending allocation to their district, but only if they exert (costly) e¤ort. We interpret
this as a reduced form representation of a more complex legislative process where e¤ort
is required to get into the right committees, to build coalitions with other legislators, to
inuence the leadership of the House etc. all of which eventually will a¤ect how successful
a legislator is at bringing the pork home.
5Experimental evidence suggest that the e¤ect of agenda setter power is weaker than suggested by
the legislative bargaining model and that proposals often pass with a super-majority (Frechette et al.,
2005). We have looked in detail at the number of votes cast in support of budget bills in one of the states
(Missouri) in our sample. We nd that most pass with a much larger majority than the 50% needed to
form a minimum winning coalition.
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2.1 The Economic and Political Structure
We consider a state with N legislative districts, indexed k = 1; :::; N . The time horizon
of the polity is innity and indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::. Each district is populated by a
continuum of citizens with measure 1. All citizens live for ever, and, for simplicity, they
do not discount the future.6 They receive the same per-period income y. This is spent
within the period on a private good or on paying taxes. Public services can be targeted
at the district level and are denoted pk. For simplicity, we shall refer to pk as pork-barrel
spending in district k. Pork-barrel spending is nanced by a uniform lump sum tax 
collected from all districts to balance the state budget:
 =
1
N
NX
k=1
pk: (1)
We require that   y and assume that there is a cap on district spending set at pk  y.7
The utility function of a voter living in district k is
u(pk) = y + v(pk)   ; (2)
where v (:) is strictly concave and increasing in pk. Voters value pork-barrel spending
in their district but fail to internalize the full tax implications of such spending. As a
consequence, their most-preferred spending level is
pV = argmax
pk
y + v(pk)  pk
N
 
P
j 6=k pj
N
: (3)
From a state welfare perspective, the optimal level of spending in a given district reects
the tax externality and is determined by maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function:
pE = argmax
pk
y + v(pk)  pk +
P
j 6=k
(y + v(pj)  pj): (4)
6This assumption can be relaxed but simplies the characterization of the political equilibrium.
7This assumption can be relaxed but maintaining it simplies the presentation of certain non-essential
features of the political equilibrium.
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It is clear that pV > pE. This is the underlying common pool problem associated with dis-
tributive politics: voters in each district want more pork-barrel spending for their district
than what is e¢ cient for the state as a whole because they only pay the fraction 1
N
of the
tax cost.
Every period the voters of each district elect one representative to the state legislature.
The legislator representing district k is recruited from among the voters of that district and
elected by the simple majority rule. The objective of the legislator is to serve his district
and thus to bring pork back to it.8 His capacity to do this, however, depends on how the
legislative process is organized in the state legislature and on his personal ability to bring
home the pork. To capture this, we assume that each legislator must exert costly e¤ort,
ek, to bring services back to his district. The amount of pork, pk, that legislator k can bring
back to his district is an increasing, concave function of his e¤ort and is denoted by f(ek).
The (personal and socially wasteful) cost of e¤ort is an increasing and convex function of
e¤ort. The fundamental assumption of the model is that legislators have di¤erent abilities
and, for some it is easier to secure pork for their district than for others. In particular, we
assume that there are two types of legislators, T 2 fL;Hg. We refer to these as e¤ective
(L) and ine¤ective (H) legislators and specify the type-specic (e¤ort) cost function as
CT (ek) = a
TC(ek); (5)
where C 0 > 0, C 00  0 and aH > aL. Type is private information to each legislator and is
a xed and unchanging attribute. The probability that a randomly chosen citizen from a
given district, once installed in o¢ ce, is of type L (H) is  (1  ).9 Citizens get ego-rents
from being in o¢ ce. The ego-rent may vary with the number of terms served and we
denote the rent associated with term  as M > 0.10 A legislator who is out of o¢ ce
8For simplicity, we refer to legislators as males. In reality, of course, many of them are women.
9These probabilities are common knowledge and also represent the population shares of potential
legislators in each district.
10Besides being realistic it is likely that the ego-rent from being elected the rst time is bigger than
that of being re-elected this assumption allows us, as we discuss below, to state the su¢ cient condition
under which all voters are willing to run for a rst term in o¢ ce as a function of the size of the rst-term
ego-rent alone.
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gets utility as any other citizen-voter. Combining these assumptions, we can write the
per-period payo¤ of a legislator of type T elected to serve district k for term  as
UT (pk) = u (pk) +M   aT c(pk); (6)
where we dene c(pk)  C(f 1(pk)) with c0 > 0 and c00  0. This formulation of the
objective function allows us to study the behavior of a legislator as if he picks district
level spending (pork-barrel) directly rather than indirectly through his e¤ort choice. We
shall, therefore, talk about the pork-barrel delivered to a district and the e¤ort that went
into bringing this outcome about as being synonymous.
The state has a term limit policy. It stipulates that a given legislator can at most serve
two consecutive terms in o¢ ce and that he can only serve once. It is useful to refer to
legislators serving their rst term as rst-term legislators and legislators who serve their
second term as last-term legislators. The timing of events within a given period t is:
1. At the beginning of the period, all newly elected rst-term legislators learn their type
and the legislature meets to decide on the spending allocation and the overall level of
taxation. Each legislator decides how much e¤ort to exert in order to secure services
for his district. This is done simultaneously. The lump sum tax is determined by the
collective choices of the N legislators to balance the budget. The voters in district
k observe the pork-barrel delivered to their district, but not that delivered to other
districts.11
2. At the end of the period, an election is held in each district using the majority rule.
If the legislator of district k is a rst-term legislator, then he may run again against a
randomly chosen challenger and the candidate who gets the support of the majority
of voters in the district gets elected to serve for the next period. If the legislator of
district k is a last-term legislator, he cannot run again and the voters of district k
elect a new legislator at random.12
11From this, they can deduce the amount of e¤ort exerted by their legislator.
12We can think of this as an election in which two challengers selected randomly from the district
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2.2 Analysis and Results
We begin the analysis by characterizing the outcome of the collective decision making
process within a given period in the absence of any electoral concerns. In this case, a
legislator of type T 2 fL;Hg takes the e¤ort levels of the other legislators as given and
chooses:
pT = argmax
pk
y + v(pk)  pk
N
 
P
j 6=k pj
N
  aT c(pk): (7)
We refer to pL and pH as the most-preferred pork-barrel spending of each type and the
e¤ort levels required to induce these as the minimum amounts of e¤ort that a legislator
of that type is always willing to exert. Irrespective of his type, the minimum amount of
e¤ort for one legislator does not depend on the choices made by the N 1 other legislators
(and hence on the composition of the legislature).13 The independence greatly simplies
the analysis of political equilibria with electoral incentives, although we do need to take
into account that realized payo¤s are interdependent.14
All legislators are willing to work for their district even if electoral incentives are absent.
The reason is that they care directly about the public services delivered to their district.
How hard a given legislator will work depends, however, on his ability. More e¤ective
legislators put in more e¤ort and, as a consequence, pL > pH . Since e¤ort is costly, even
pL is less than what the voters of the district really want (pL < pV ). However, precisely
because the e¤ort is costly, if legislators happen to be very ine¤ective at securing pork, it
is possible that the most-preferred spending level of individual legislators is less than the
e¢ cient level of spending pE.15 In order to focus on the (relevant) case where distributive
population compete. Since voters have no information about their types, they are indi¤erent between
them. Citizens chosen at random to run can, in principle, decline to do so. We discuss this issue in more
detail below.
13This would not be the case if we allow the spending production function f(ek) or the e¤ort cost
functions aTC(ek) to depend on the e¤ort of other legislators. In that case, the composition of the
legislature would matter. We looked at this empirically and cannot nd any evidence that such inter-
dependencies are important [results are available upon request] and so, we decided not to complicate the
model in this direction.
14The reason is that the tax bill payable by citizens in a particular district depends on how much pork
other districts get.
15Our e¢ ciency benchmark (pE) does not take the e¤ort cost into account for two reasons. Firstly, the
e¤ort represents socially wasteful activities, and, secondly, these activities can be avoided by a utilitarian
social planner.
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politics is associated with a common pool problem (i.e., pH > pE), we assume throughout
that
aH <
N   1
Nc0(pE)
: (8)
With this assumption in place, we can rank the spending levels as follows: pE < pH <
pL < pV .
The voters of each particular district prefer more pork-barrel spending to less (up to
pV ) and know that pL > pH . They will, therefore, try to use the power of the ballot
box to get rid of rst-term legislators of type H and aim at re-electing legislators of type
L only. Since legislators must exert e¤ort to bring pork-barrel spending back to their
district, a randomly selected citizen may, unless the ego-rent is su¢ ciently large, prefer
not to stand for election and let someone else do the heavy lifting. To ensure a ready
supply of legislators of both types, we assume that the rst-term ego-rent M1 satises the
following su¢ cient condition:
M1 > a
Lc(y) + (1  )aHc(pH): (9)
This assumption, which says that the rst-term ego-rent is larger than the maximum
expected cost of e¤ort for a rst-term legislator, ensures that any voter even if he does not
anticipate to get re-elected will be willing to serve for one term and do (at least) what is
required of his type in equilibrium.16
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) to characterize outcomes of the legislative
process in the presence of electoral incentives. Last-term legislators cannot run again due
to the term limit and face no electoral incentives. They will, therefore, exert the minimum
e¤ort needed to bring home pL or pH and the voters of those districts elect a new legislator
at random. The situation is more complex in a district k represented by a rst-term
legislator. In those districts, a PBE consists of an e¤ort choice (and an associated amount
of pork-barrel spending) one for each type of legislator a re-election rule, and a set of
16It is a su¢ cient condition because it assumes that legislators of type L will have to exert e¤ort to
bring back the maximum possible amount of pork (pk = y) and because it ignores the value of re-election.
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Bayes-consistent beliefs held by voters in the district, such that
1. rst-term legislators of each type exert an optimal amount of e¤ort (thus securing an
optimal amount of pork-barrel spending to their district) given the re-election rule
in their district and the choices of the other legislators;
2. the re-election rule is optimal given the votersbeliefs about the type of the districts
incumbent and the incumbents strategy;
3. votersbeliefs are whenever possible updated according to Bayes rule.
The voters of a district represented by a rst-term legislator vote for the incumbent if the
expected utility with him in the seat for a second term is larger than the expected utility
of electing a randomly chosen challenger.17
Within the class of pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, two types of politi-
cal equilibria can potentially emerge: pooling equilibria in which all types of rst-term
legislators select the same e¤ort level and separating equilibria in which the two types
exert di¤erent level of e¤ort in their rst term. We can, however, rule pooling equilibria
out.18 To see how, consider a candidate pooling equilibrium in which all types of rst-
term legislators deliver pL and expect to be re-elected. First-term legislators of type H
cater to voters by pretending to be more e¤ective in producing pork than they really are,
and voters reward rst-term legislators with re-election for doing so. In their second and
nal term, ine¤ective legislators would, however, reveal their true ability and deliver pH .
Voters foresee this and it is optimal for them to deviate from the proposed equilibrium
strategy and not to re-elect rst-term legislators who delivered pL. The reason simply is
that irrespective of the type, the next rst-term legislator will, by assumption, play the
pooling equilibrium strategy and deliver pL. Getting pL for sure is better for voters than
getting pL with probability  and pH with probability 1  . Thus, pooling on pL cannot
be an equilibrium. A similar argument rules out pooling equilibria involving pooling on
17In case of indi¤erence between re-electing or not, we assume that voters re-elect, as in Maskin and
Tirole (2004).
18We thank a referee for pointing this out.
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some other p. The intuition behind this is that if all rst-term legislators can be trusted
to secure more pork than pH , then voters prefer to have a rst-term legislator in the seat
each period and will never re-elect anyone. This eliminates the incentive of rst-term
legislators of type H to do anything but putting in the minimum e¤ort and deliver pH to
their district.
In any separating equilibrium, it must be in the interest of rst-term legislators of
di¤erent types to di¤erentiate their pork-barrel spending to such an extent that voters can
deduce their type from observing how much pork they bring home and then only re-elect
those whose type is revealed to be L. Thus, in equilibrium, rst-term legislators of type H
will not be re-elected and so they put in the minimum e¤ort needed to deliver pH during
their rst (and only) term in o¢ ce. To get re-elected, rst-term legislators of type Lmay,
on the other hand, have to exert extra e¤ort to bring home pork-barrel spending beyond
pL. We denote the equilibrium amount of spending delivered by a rst-term legislator of
type L serving in district k by epLk . To enable voters to distinguish between the two types
of legislators, it must be the case that a rst-term legislator of type H is not willing to
mimic a legislator of type L by delivering epLk . This requires that epLk satises:19
v(epLk )  epLkN   aHc(epLk )  (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

+ 

v(epLk )  epLkN

 M2: (10)
At the same time, it must be in the interest of legislators of type L to put in the extra e¤ort
needed to bring the extra pork back to their district (epLk ) in order to get re-elected rather
than to forgo re-election and simply put in the minimum amount of e¤ort and deliver pL.
This requires that epLk satises:
v(epLk )  epLkN   aLc(epLk )  (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

+ 

v(pL)  p
L
N

 M2: (11)
We denote the (largest) spending levels that solve equations (10) and (11) with equality
by bpH and bpL, respectively.20 E¤ort is costly to legislators. Consequently, in the quest
19Details of this and subsequent derivations are collected in Appendix A which also contains the proofs
of the propositions stated below.
20We have omitted subscript k to highlight that the cut-o¤ values are the same across districts. This
17
for re-election, legislators of either type are only willing to exert more than the minimum
amount of e¤ort if the second-term ego-rent, M2, is su¢ ciently large. To make sure that
legislators have an incentive to put in more e¤ort than the minimum, we assume that
M2 > max fML;MHg where MH = aHc(pH) and21
ML  aLc(pL) + (1  )

(v(pH)  p
H
N
)  (v  pL  pL
N
)

: (12)
This guarantees that bpL > pL and that bpH > pH , i.e., that the two types are, indeed,
willing to exert extra e¤ort if that can get them re-elected. A comparison of equations
(10) and (11) shows that bpL > bpH . That is, legislators of type L are willing to put in more
e¤ort to get re-elected than legislators of type H. Intuitively, this is because exerting e¤ort
is cheaper for legislators of type L than for type H (aH > aL). As a consequence, anyepLk 2 bpH ; bpL is a candidate strategy for legislators of type L in a separating equilibrium.
On the one hand, rst-term legislators of type L are willing to exert the e¤ort needed to
bring that much pork home and get re-elected. On the other hand, legislators of type
H are not willing to do so. They prefer to exert the minimum e¤ort (and deliver pH)
to putting in the extra e¤ort needed to bring home any amount of pork in this interval,
even if doing so could get them re-elected for a second term. The intuition, again, is that
it is cheaper for e¤ective legislators to deliver extrapork to their district than it is for
ine¤ective legislators to do so.
We can reduce the set of separating equilibria to a singleton by eliminating weakly
dominated strategies and imposing some additional, but reasonable, restrictions on the
out-of-equilibrium beliefs of voters (discussed in appendix A). This allows us to focus on
the signalling equilibrium that is least costly to legislators of type L, i.e., the one that
requires such legislators to put in the least extra e¤ort to signal their type. The following
proposition characterizes this particular separating equilibrium.22
follows from the fact that the pL and pH are independent of the district in which a legislator is elected.
21To derive these thresholds, we evaluate equation (10) at epLk = pH and equation (11) at epLk = pL.
22All proofs are in appendix A.
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Proposition 1 (Signalling equilibrium) Dene
MS  aHc(pL) + (1  )

(v(pH)  p
H
N
)  (v  pL  pL
N
)

: (13)
For M2 > MS, a unique undominated separating equilibrium in pure strategies exists and
is supported by the following strategies and beliefs:
1. First-term legislators of type L exert the e¤ort level that delivers bpH > pL in their
rst term. First-term legislators of type H exert the e¤ort level that delivers pH in
their rst term.
2. Voters of district k re-elect their rst-term legislator if and only if pk = bpH .
3. The posterior belief of voters of district k that the rst-term legislator of their district
is of type L is 1 if they observe bpH and 0 if they observe pH .
4. Last-term legislators of type L exert the e¤ort level that delivers pL while last-term
legislators of type H exert the e¤ort level that delivers pH .
Corollary 2 (Screening equilibrium). If maxfML;MHg  M2  MS, then rst-term
legislators of type L can reveal their type by exerting the minimum amount of e¤ort and
deliver pL.
The proposition characterizes two types of separating equilibria. The most interesting
of these is the signalling equilibrium. In this equilibrium, rst-term legislators of type L
put in extra e¤ort to bring home additional pork to their district and in that way to signal
their commitment to the district they represent. Voters, in turn, reward them for doing so
with re-election. The other type is a screening equilibrium in which rst-term legislators of
type L are able to reveal their type and get re-elected without having to put in extra e¤ort
during their rst term. The signalling equilibrium is applicable when the second-term ego-
rent is larger than the critical valueMS dened in equation (13). Intuitively, the size of the
ego-rent controls whether rst-term legislators of type H have a strong or a weak incentive
to mimic type L in their bid for re-election. The larger is the ego-rent for the second term,
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the stronger the incentive. First-term legislators of type L will, therefore, have to over-
exerte¤ort to convince voters that they are really e¤ective at getting services delivered
to their district.23 If, on the other hand, the ego-rent is relatively low (M  MS), then
the incentive to mimic is weak, and rst-term legislators of type L can reveal themselves
without having to exert extra e¤ort. They simply put in the minimum amount of e¤ort
to deliver pL and get re-elected for doing so because voters know that even such a modest
amount of pork is beyond what an ine¤ective legislator would ever be willing to deliver.
The main empirical prediction of the model concerns the impact of electoral incentives
on district-level spending over the life-cycle of the legislator elected to represent it. Last-
term legislators face no electoral incentives, as they, by denition, have to step down, but
rst-term legislators do. The di¤erence between what a legislator does in his rst and last
term, therefore, captures the e¤ect of electoral incentives. We refer to this di¤erence as
the last-term e¤ect. Since only legislators of type L get re-elected to the term limit, the
last-term e¤ectis
k = max
bpH ; pL	  pL: (14)
We can summarize the main prediction of the model as follows.
Proposition 3 (The last-term e¤ect) The amount of spending allocated to a particular
legislative district is (weakly) smaller when the legislator representing that district is in his
last term compared to when he is not, i.e., k  0.
This proposition provides a reason why the pork-barrel spending allocated to a given
legislative district falls immediately before the term limit becomes binding for the legislator
representing it compared to the spending allocation to that same district in previous
periods during which the same legislator represents it. This last-term e¤ectarises because
a binding term limit eliminates the need for e¤ective legislators to put in extra e¤ort to
show commitment to their voters. This last-term e¤ectis most pronounced in societies
in which legislators enjoy a large (second-term) ego-rent and may be entirely absent in
23The second-term ego-rent cannot, however, be too large. This is because it would then be infeasible,
given the constraint that pk  y, for rst-term legislators of type L to bring back an amount of pork that
would never be matched by type H. The exact condition is provided in appendix A.
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societies in which the ego-rent is modest (below the threshold MS such that the screening
equilibrium is played). It is important to stress that the last-term e¤ect isolates the
incentive e¤ect of elections from any selection e¤ects. It does so because it is based on
a comparison between what happens over the life-cycle of a particular legislator of xed
type.
As noted above, pooling equilibria in which legislators of type H cater to voters during
their rst term do not exist in our model. However, if legislators gain experience during
their rst term24, as in Bernhardt et al. (2004), voters may be willing to keep legislators
for a second term rather than selecting a novice at each election. In this case, pooling
equilibria may emerge and provide another reason why spending falls in the last term that
a legislator serves.
In the absence of electoral incentives, all legislators exert the minimum amount of
e¤ort to deliver, depending on their type, pL or pH to their district. This is, in general,
ine¢ cient from the point of view of the state because each legislator fails to internalize the
tax cost falling on other districts. We refer to this as the underlying common pool problem.
As suggested by the Law of 1/N, this underlying problem becomes more serious, in the
sense that the overspending bias is larger, when the number of districts (N) increases,
i.e., @p
T
@N
=   1
(v00(pT ) aT c00(pT ))N2 > 0 for T 2 fH;Lg. This is well-known. What is new
and interesting is the fact that electoral incentives also serve to magnify the tendency for
overspending and thus add to the underlying common pool problem. This is because the
desire to gain re-election, in the signalling equilibrium, forces rst-term legislators of type
L to exert extra e¤ort so as to bring more pork back to their district than they otherwise
would have brought (bpH > pL ). For a given number of legislative districts, the underlying
common pool problem is, therefore, exaggerated by rst-term legislators of type L vowing
to get re-elected.
An important question is how the Law of 1/N and the last-term e¤ectinteract. In
particular, does an increase in the number of districts magnify or dampen the last-term
e¤ectassociated with the signalling equilibrium, i.e., is k(N) = bpH(N)   pL(N) larger
24One could imagine that it requires less e¤ort for all types of legislators to bring pork back to their
district in their second than in their rst term.
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when there are more districts and, ceteris paribus, a more serious underlying common pool
problem? The answer is not straight forward. This is because an increase in N a¤ects
both the amount of pork-barrel spending that last-term legislators bring to their district
(pL(N)) and the need to inate rst-term spending to get re-elected (bpH(N)). The former
e¤ect unambiguously dampens the last-term e¤ectbecause pL(N) is increasing in N . The
latter e¤ect is ambiguous. To see why, recall that the least extra pork a legislator of type
L must bring home to get re-elected is dened by the most extra pork (bpH) a legislator of
type H would ever be willing to bring home to get re-elected. bpH is dened by
v(bpH)  bpH
N
  aHc(bpH) = (1  )v(pH)  pH
N

+ 

v(bpH)  bpH
N

 M2: (15)
An increase in N has two e¤ects on bpH which work in opposite directions. On the one
hand, an increase in N reduces the cost for legislators of type H to pretend to be of type
L. This is because there are more districts to share the tax cost of the extra spending
required and, as a consequence, the left-hand side of equation (15) is larger for a givenbpH . This, ceteris paribus, makes legislators of type H more eager to mimic and thus bpH
increases. On the other hand, the expected payo¤ as an ordinary voter, represented by the
right hand side of equation (15), also increases in N and for the same reason: there are
more districts to share the tax cost of any given spending level. This reduces the incentive
to mimic and thus bpH decreases. The next proposition provides a mild su¢ cient condition
that ensures that the last-term e¤ectis smaller in a larger legislature.
Proposition 4 (Interaction between the Law of 1/N and the last-term e¤ect). Assume
that v000 = c000 = 0. The last-term e¤ectis smaller when there are more legislative districts,
i.e.,
@k
@N
< 0 (16)
for M > MS.
An increase in the number of districts tends to moderate the last-term e¤ect. Al-
though, electoral incentives magnify the underlying common pool problem in general,
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they do so less in societies where the common pool problem is already large, i.e. where
the number of districts is large.
A su¢ cient condition for this to be true is that the rate at which the marginal benet
of spending falls and the rate at which the marginal e¤ort cost increases do not vary with
the level of spending, i.e., the second derivatives of v(:) and c(:) are constant over the
relevant range from pH to bpH . This guarantees that the direct e¤ect of the Law of 1/N on
the last-term e¤ectcoming from the increase in pL dominates any indirect e¤ects coming
from the e¤ect of N on bpH . We stress that the condition is a su¢ cient condition; that is,
@k
@N
< 0 holds even if v000 and c000 are di¤erent from zero, as long as they are not extremely
large in absolute value.
Proposition 4 delivers the second testable prediction of that model that we take to the
data. In fact, one way to look at the proposition is that it suggests a new, indirect test of
the Law of 1/N.
3 Data
Our empirical evidence comes from seven US state Houses of Representatives. We study
the e¤ect of electoral incentives faced by state legislators on the allocation of state funding
to their districts using the variation in incentives generated by term limits. To do this, we
join together three types of data:
1. Data on individual state legislators elected to the state House of Representatives in
each state.
2. Data on the term limit policies of each state House.
3. Data on the allocation of state spending across legislative districts within each state.
In this section, we discuss these data in more detail.
During the 1990s, twenty one US states introduced limits on how long individual leg-
islators can serve in their state legislatures.25 We focus on seven of these states during
25Six of these subsequently repealed these term limits.
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the period 1993 to 2004.26 The states are Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio,
Oklahoma and South Dakota.27 ;28 For each of the seven states, we gather data on the
representatives who served in the state House during the sample period. These data are
constructed from state legislative election results available in the State Elections Database
by Carsey et al. (2008), and complemented with information from state legislative rosters,
election records, and state government almanacs. The dataset covers 1; 574 legislators, rep-
resenting approximately 600 legislative districts. The length of service varies from 1 year
to 35 years, with an average of just over 9 years. The legislators in the sample are equally
split between Republicans and Democrats.
Table 1 reports the number of state legislators in the sample, broken down by state.
The table also records when legislative term limits were adopted in the seven states, and
when they became binding for the rst time. Using this and the information on when each
legislator was rst elected into the House, we calculate the year in which the term limit
becomes binding for each legislator. There are 328 legislators who served for the maximum
number of terms and thus were forced to step down because of the term limit.
<Table 1: State Houses of Representatives and term limits in the seven states>
The major challenge is to estimate the amounts of money allocated from the state
budget to individual legislative districts, i.e., to estimate pork-barrel spending within each
state. We do so by tracing transfers from the state budgets to local government units (mu-
nicipalities, counties, school districts etc.), and then by matching these local government
units to the legislative districts in which they reside. In the remainder of this section, we
explain in more detail how we do this, discuss the merits and limitations of our approach,
and present some descriptive statistics. Appendix B contains a more detailed exposition
of the method that we used to match state spending to legislative districts and lists all
26For Louisiana the data cover 1992-2005.
27These states represent three out of four regions of the USA: Midwest, South and West, and contain
12% of the US population.
28Of the fteen states that currently have legislative term limits, the remaining eight are not in our
sample because data on geographical boundaries of their legislative districts were not available (California,
Florida, Maine, Montana, Michigan, and Arkansas), because the term limits were not binding during the
period we consider (Nevada) or because they do not have a House of Representatives (Nebraska).
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the sources we have drawn upon.
3.1 Matching Spending to Legislative Districts
The US Census Bureau collects annual data on the scal accounts of all local government
units within each state. These data, which include transfers from the state budget to
local government units, are reported in the State and Local Government Finance (SLGF)
database and in the Public ElementarySecondary Education Finance (PESEF) database.
The local government units represent counties, municipalities, school districts and special
districts (water districts, library districts, housing development agencies etc.).29
The transfers from the state budget are, typically, allocated to these local government
units to help fund specic categories of services. Using the SLGF databases disaggre-
gation of items, we distinguish among nine categories of transfers. These categories are
education, health and hospitals, highways, housing and community development, public
welfare, utilities (water supply, gas supply, electric power, and sewerage), public mass
transit systems, general local government support, and all other (US Census Bureau,
2006). For state transfers to school districts, the PESEF database goes one step further
and makes a very useful distinction between transfers governed by a pre-specied formula,
typically based on enrollment numbers, and transfers that are not governed by such rules.
We match the geographical location of the local government units that receive trans-
fers from the state budget to the geographical location of the state legislative districts.
This is done by inputting the geographical boundary data provided by the US Census
Bureau Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing System (TIGER)
into custom-written software that calculates the area overlaps between each local govern-
ment unit and legislative district pair. State legislative boundaries were redrawn following
the decennial Census in year 2000. We account for this by generating two sets of matches,
with old and new legislative boundaries, and then use the appropriate match.
29The US Census Bureau operates with a fth category: townships. Geographical boundary data are
not available for townships. Therefore, we could not match them to legislative districts. For that reason,
townships are not included in the analysis. The share of total state transfers allocated through townships
is negligible.
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Smaller local government units, such as most municipalities, are located within a single
legislative district in their entirety. In these cases, we allocate the total transfer from the
state budget to that local government unit to the legislative district within which it resides.
On the other hand, larger local government units, e.g., school districts and counties, often
straddle two or more legislative districts. In such cases, we attribute a share of the transfers
to each legislative district. The share is equal to the percentage area overlap between the
jurisdiction of each local government unit and the legislative district. Adding up all these
shares provides an estimate of the total transfer from the state budget to each legislative
district in each year. This is our estimate of pork-barrel spending.
3.2 Merits and Limitations
The main advantage of our matching approach is that it delivers an estimate of state
budget transfers to each of about 600 legislative districts across seven states. We are not
aware of other work that does this on a similar scale.30 The closest predecessor is the
work by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006). They draw upon the same US Census Bureau
data as us, but focus on spending allocated to counties and do not attempt to allocate
these state transfers to individual legislative districts. Our approach, in contrast, generates
information on the geographical allocation of spending across legislative districts and does
so for a broader range of transfers, including signicant transfers to school districts.
At the same time, our approach clearly has limitations. The main limitation is that
our estimate of district-specic pork-barrel spending is noisy. What we ideally would like
to quantify is the pork-barrel that a legislator manages, through his e¤ort and skill, to
channel to his district from the state budget and which would not come to the district
in the absence of the legislators actions. This is inherently unobserved and can only be
measured with error. There are two broad categories of errors and they go in opposite
directions.
30Thompson (1986) and Thompson and Moncrief (1988) study allocation of pork-barrel spending across
legislative districts in North Carolina. Their focus is on a narrow group of projects which ow through
special appropriation bills and account for less than one percent of the total state budget. Although
their analysis conrms that distributive politics is important, their sample is too small to make statistical
inferences based on it.
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First, our estimate might not capture all of the pork-barrel that a legislator procures for
his district. In our sample, the transfers from the state budget to local government units
constitute just over a quarter of all state spending.31 ;32 The rest is, then, spent on goods
and services procured by the state government directly from the private sector or from
non-governmental organizations and not channeled through local government units. Some
of this spending is on items with geographically di¤use benets, but a proportion must be
on items that benet particular legislative districts and, therefore, should be counted as
pork-barrel. For example, if a state builds a state prison in one of the districts, then the
local population benets from more jobs even though this is not reected in the accounts
of any local government unit and thus not included in our estimate of pork-barrel. It is,
therefore, clear that our estimate leaves out some types of pork and can, in this sense,
be considered a lower bound on the amount of pork-barrel spending. At the same time,
Gosling (1985) argues that state legislators predominately use spending that goes through
local government units to bring back the pork, and, so we stress that the portion of pork
that our estimate does capture is likely to be politically salient.
Second, our estimate might include some spending that would accrue to a district
regardless of the e¤ort exerted by the legislator representing it and which should, therefore,
not be considered pork-barrel. It is notoriously di¢ cult to obtain direct and systematic
evidence on how much of a hand particular legislators have in securing funds for their
districts. Here, we make two observations. Firstly, transfers that accrue to a district
(through local government units) without the legislators involvement will work against
us nding evidence of a last-term e¤ect. In the limit, if legislators cannot inuence the
spending allocation at all, then there should not be any systematic patterns in our measure
of district-specic spending over their legislative life-cycle. Secondly, we make a distinction
between categories of transfers over which individual legislators are likely to have no or
little inuence, such as school formula spending, and categories of spending over which it
31This is net of spending on state government administration.
32To put this gure into perspective, we might notice that the transfers from the state budget account
for approximately one third of all spending by local government units and is similar to the proportion
accounted for by local taxes. Put di¤erently, the transfers from the state budgets of the seven states to
local government units are of a similar magnitude to the transfers that these state governments receive
from the federal government.
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is more plausible, a priori, that individual legislators can exert some inuence. We expect
to nd a smaller e¤ect of electoral incentives amongst items in the rst category compared
to the second. This provides a reality check on the reliability of our estimate of pork.
In addition to these general issues, the matching procedure itself rests on two particular
assumptions. First, it presumes that the geographical boundaries of a local government
unit (say, a county or a school district) dene the citizens who benet from the state
spending channeled through that unit. In many instances (e.g., for spending on schools
within a school district) this approximates reality closely, but in others (e.g., for spending
on roads) the presumption is more doubtful. Second, our matching algorithm assumes
that the benets of the services funded by state transfers are spread evenly across the
geographical area to which they are allocated. Violations of these two assumptions lead to
errors similar to the ones discussed above: we may attribute either too much or too little
to a particular legislative district, although now this is because we might mis-attribute the
benets across districts.
To summarize, our estimate of district-specic spending may over- or under-estimate
the pork that particular legislators manage to bring back to their district. However, this
noise is most unlikely to be a source of bias in our test of the last-term e¤ectand the
Law of 1/N. As we discuss in more detail in section 4, we use term limits to generate
variation in electoral incentives. When they become binding for a particular legislator is
exogenous with respect to that legislators past performance. It is, therefore, most unlikely
that the error with which we measure pork-barrel spending is correlated with whether
the legislator, who represents the receiving district and who serves the maximum allowed
term, is in his last term or not.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the estimates of the transfers to legislative districts
in each of the seven states. On average, a district receives US$400 per capita (in 1984
dollars) from the state budget, but there is signicant variation across states, and large
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variation within states across legislative districts.33 The real value of the transfers, aver-
aged across all districts and states, rose steadily over the course of the sample period, from
$326 per capita in 1992 to $466 per capita in 2005.
<Table 2: Total transfers from the state budget to legislative districts>
Table 3 shows the breakdown of transfers from the state budget to legislative districts
by the purpose for which they are intended. We make a distinction between two main
categories of transfers. The rst category, which we refer to as non-discretionary transfers,
collects those transfers that are allocated according to some pre-specied formula or rule.
This includes all transfers to the school districts that in the PESEF database are classied
as following a formula34, welfare payments, such as unemployment benets, and transfers
to utilities. The second category, which we refer to as discretionary transfers, collects the
rest of the transfers, which are not, as far as we can tell, allocated according to xed rules.
This includes non-formula education spending, spending on highways, health, transport
subsidies, housing, and local government support.35 We believe that non-discretionary
transfersare more likely to be outside a legislators control than discretionary transfers.
<Table 3: Breakdown of transfers to legislative districts by transfer type>
From table 3, we notice that elementary and secondary education receive the largest
per capita transfers, followed by local government support and spending on highways.
Importantly, 87 percent of all state spending on elementary and secondary education is
channelled through the school districts and can, therefore, be geographically attributed
using our matching approach. For the other categories, such as spending on utilities,
the share of direct state provision is much higher and the bulk of state spending in these
categories cannot be attributed to particular legislative districts. There is a lot of variation
within each type. The variation is highest for discretionary transfers, with a coe¢ cient of
variation that is twice that of non-discretionary transfers.
33We note that our geographical matching method overstates this variation relative to its true (unob-
served) value.
34For more information on the use of school formula in the US states, see Verstegen and Jordan (2009).
35We experimented with allocating utilities to either group, and our results remain una¤ected by this.
We report the results with utilities included as non-discretionary transfers.
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4 A Test of the Last-term E¤ect
In this section, we discuss the evidence on the last-term e¤ectamongst state legislators
in the seven US states. In section 5, we discuss the test of the Law of 1/N.
4.1 Identication
The main testable prediction of our model is that a representative who serves his last term
allowed under the states term limit rules will bring less transfers to his district than he did
in previous terms when he could seek re-election. To examine this prediction, we estimate
the following equation
yijt = (last term)ijt +
0xijt + "ijt; (17)
where i denotes a legislator, j a state, and t a year. The variable yijt denotes the estimate
of the (real) per capita transfer to the district of legislator i from the state budget in state
j in year t. The variable last term is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one
if a legislator is in his last allowed term under the states term limit laws. The vector x
collects various xed e¤ects and other controls that we discuss in more detail below, and
"ijt is the error term. We are interested in the sign of . Our model predicts that   0
and is rejected if  > 0.
We now elaborate on how we identify the e¤ect of electoral incentives on pork-barrel
spending and compare our identication strategy to that used in previous empirical work
on the subject. To this end, it is useful to consider a simple example, illustrated in Figure
1, with two districts A and B in a state that allows a maximum of four two year terms. In
the period between 1991 and 2003, district A rst elects Stanley, who serves for two terms,
and then looses to Blanche. Blanche is re-elected subsequently every time until she reaches
the maximum of four two year terms and is forced to step down in 2003. In district B,
representative Mitch is rst elected in 1991 and is re-elected every time until he has served
the maximum of four two year terms and is forced to step down in 1999. He is replaced by
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Stella in 1999, who is re-elected once, and then decides not to stand for election in 2003.
In the example, our main independent variable last term is equal to one in district A in
2001 and 2002 (during Blanches last two years in o¢ ce) and in district B in 1997 and
1998 (during Mitchs last two years in o¢ ce). It is equal to zero in all other cases.
The most naive approach to identication of the e¤ect of electoral incentives on district-
specic transfers from the state budget is to compare E(yijtjlast term = 1) to E(yijtjlast
term = 0). This involves a comparison across districts A and B. Clearly, the demographic,
economic, and political characteristics di¤er across districts and this may cause voters in
di¤erent districts to prefer or need di¤erent levels of spending. Moreover, these charac-
teristics are often correlated with the nature of politics in the district and may, therefore,
a¤ect the probability that a legislator survivesto the term limit. For this reason, it is
di¢ cult, if not impossible, to obtain an unbiased estimate of the last-term e¤ectfrom
between-district comparisons of this sort. District xed e¤ects partly address this prob-
lem by limiting inference to within-district di¤erences. This is the approach followed by
Besley and Case (1995) in their work on gubernatorial term limits, electoral incentives and
aggregate state spending.36
Basing inference solely on within-district variation eliminates some important sources
of bias, but not all. To see this, let us return to the example in Figure 1. In this ex-
ample, a within-district comparison includes the comparison of the state transfers that
Stanley brings to those that Blanche brings. This contaminates the estimate of the last-
term e¤ectbecause Blanche, who survives for the maximum allowed number of terms, and
Stanley, who is voted out after the rst term, are likely to be systematically di¤erent in
their capacity to secure funds for the district. To illustrate, suppose that our model is the
true data generating process. In equilibrium, the average transfer secured by legislators
who survives till the last term is higher than that of the rest. This is because only e¤ec-
tivelegislators of type L (in the example, Blanche) will ever reach the term limit, while
ine¤ectivelegislators of type H (in the example, Stanley) get systematically deselected.
36To be precise, Besley and Case (1995) study the behavior of state governors and use a design with
state xed e¤ects to identify the last-term e¤ect. Their state xed e¤ects play the same role as district
xed e¤ects in our context.
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This mechanism biases the estimate of  upwards and makes it impossible to identify the
incentive e¤ect of elections separately from the selection e¤ect.
In their recent work on corruption in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2011) propose a way
around this selection problem. Paraphrased within the context of our example, their
proposal is to limit the sample to legislators like Blanche and Mitch who are re-elected for
the maximum number of terms. This eliminates the selection problem (again, according to
our theory, both would be of type L) and produces an unbiased estimate of the incentive
e¤ect if Blanches rst three terms are a good counterfactual for what Mitchs rst three
terms would have been like. This assumption is easier to defend in some contexts than
in others. First, if the number of legislators per district is small (as is the case in our
data), then district xed e¤ects cannot be used with this strategy. Therefore, this strategy
necessitates not only comparison across legislators within a district but also across districts.
We have already discussed the drawbacks of such comparisons above. Second, even if the
approach deals with selection into survival, the legislators who get re-elected till the term
limit binds may still di¤er systematically in ways that bias the estimate of the last-term
e¤ect. For instance, if there are systematic cohort e¤ects, then, even if Blanche and Mitch
happened to have been elected in the same district, Blanches rst three terms would not
be a good counterfactual for Mitchs. In the context of our sample of US state legislators,
such cohort e¤ects are likely to be important. Recall that we study the state legislatures
during the period when legislative term limits are rst introduced. One of the widely
accepted rationales for term limits is that they induces a (desirable) change in the type of
candidates willing to run for o¢ ce (see, for instance, Cato Institute (1996)). Insofar as this
actually happened, the pool of legislators would change systematically within our sample
period. This implies that legislators from di¤erent cohorts cannot readily be compared to
each other, and, within our setting, any attempt to estimate the incentive e¤ect of elections
by comparisons across legislators is likely to confound cohort e¤ects with incentive e¤ects.
The richness of our data, however, allows for a di¤erent and, we argue, more appropriate
identication strategy. Since we have a decent number of observations for each term
limited legislator (up to 12 years), we can identify the e¤ect of electoral incentives by
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using only within-legislator variation. This is achieved by including legislator xed e¤ects
into equation (17). By doing so, the last term served by a legislator is only compared to
the earlier terms of that same legislator, i.e., returning to the example of Figure 1, the
transfers that Blanche secured in 2001 and 2002 are compared to the transfers she herself
secured district A between 1995 and 2000. This addresses the selection problem head on
without inviting systematic biases from di¤erences across districts, legislators, or cohorts.
Moreover, the main prediction of our model regarding electoral incentives in proposition
3 concerns precisely such a comparison. This provides another rationale for our choice of
identication strategy.
In addition to legislator xed e¤ects, we also take into account that all the districts
in a state are a¤ected by common (scal) shocks or trends. We do this by controlling for
state-specic year e¤ects in all our estimations.
To summarize our identication strategy, we estimate the e¤ect of electoral incentives
using term limits in a specication that includes legislator xed e¤ects and state-specic
year e¤ects. The latter implies that we compare the transfer that a particular legislator
brings to his district to the amount received by an average district in that state in that
year. The former implies that we identify the last-term e¤ectby comparing the amount
of transfers that the legislator brought to his district (relative to what an average district
got in that year in that state) in the legislators last term to that he brought to the district
in previous terms when electoral incentives were still operating.
There are two additional issues that deserve comment before we discuss the estimation
results. Firstly, the analysis is predicated on the assumption that the term limit rules gen-
erate exogenous variation in electoral incentives. The fact that term limits were introduced
during the sample period might raise concerns that the decision to adopt these limits could
have been driven by the same unobserved factors that drove budget allocations. While this
would clearly be a major concern in the context of cross-state comparisons, all we need
to assume within our research design with legislator xed and state-specic year e¤ects is
that the timing of when the term limit becomes binding for individual legislators is (con-
ditionally) uncorrelated with the legislative choices made by those particular legislators.
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We think this is a very plausible assumption to make. Secondly, while our identication
strategy e¤ectively deals with state-specic over time uctuations in spending and with
the concern that those legislators who surviveto the term limit are systematically di¤er-
ent from those who do not, the estimate of the last-term e¤ectcould be biased if time
varying unobserved factors for individual legislators are important. One particular concern
is learning-by-doing or experience e¤ects. Such e¤ects would imply that the transfer that a
particular legislator secures for his district may increase with years of service. Although we
cannot rule experience e¤ects out, we stress that they work against us nding a negative
last-term e¤ect.
4.2 Evidence
We present the evidence on the incentive e¤ect of elections in four sub-sections. The main
results are presented in the next sub-section. The following sub-section investigates party
di¤erences while the third sub-section discusses some robustness checks. In the last sub-
section, we present some additional evidence on the last-term e¤ect in the absence of
term limits.
4.2.1 Main Results
Table 4 reports our headline estimates of the incentive e¤ect of elections using the variation
in electoral incentives due to legislative term limits in the specication with legislator
xed e¤ects and state-specic time e¤ects.37 The rst column reports the result for total
per capita transfers to each legislative district. We see that the transfer falls during a
legislators last term relative to previous terms served by that same legislator, and that
this e¤ect is signicant at the ve percent level. On average, the total transfer falls by $14
per capita in a legislators last term. This corresponds to a 3.5 percent fall in the average
district.
37Some districts are represented by more than one legislator. In these cases, we matched each legislator
with the total transfer to the district. For this reason, we cluster at district-year level when estimating all
standard errors.
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In the second column, we report the results when we restrict attention to education
spending. As noted in the discussion above, transfers for primary and secondary education
are targeted at well-dened geographical areas (school districts) and constitute the largest
component of total state transfers. It is, therefore, of special interest to look for a last-
term e¤ectfor this sub-category. We observe a statistically signicant fall in education
transfers in the last term of a legislator in the order of $10 per capita.
In columns 3 and 4, we report the results for discretionary and non-discretionary trans-
fers separately. Conceptually, we conjecture that the last-term e¤ectis present only for
spending items over which we can reasonably assume that legislators have (some) dis-
cretion as opposed to items which are based on pre-specied formulas. In line with this
conjecture, we nd that discretionary transfers fall in a legislators last term (column 3),
while the e¤ect is insignicant for non-discretionary transfers (column 4). The magnitude
of the e¤ect for discretionary transfers is about $10 per capita. Overall, these estimates are
consistent with the main prediction of the model. They suggest that electoral incentives
induce a tendency for overspending early in a legislators career when re-election incentives
are still important.
[Table 4: Test of the last-term e¤ect: The main results]
4.2.2 The Role of Political Parties
Parties play an important role in US politics. At the heart of much existing analysis of party
politics, at least in the political economics literature, is the conict between the party that
is interested in the total share of seats and individual legislators who are interested in their
own seat only (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (2006)). The degree to which individual
legislators will toe the party line depends on the partys internal system of incentives and
governance, and is often referred to in the literature as party discipline(see, e.g., Alesina
and Spear (1988) or Dhami (2003)). Strong party discipline may mitigate the e¤ect of
electoral incentives for individual legislators (for instance, the incentive to acquire pork
at the expense of other districts in situations where the party may want to strengthen its
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general support in the state). There is a body of empirical work documenting cross-party
di¤erences that suggests that the Republican Party tends to be more disciplined in this
sense than the Democratic Party (see, e.g., McGillivray (1997), Besley and Case (1995),
and Knight (2005)).
To investigate if a similar di¤erence exists at the level of individual state legislators,
we allow for the possibility that electoral incentives operate di¤erently across Democrats
and Republicans. Specically, we introduce three dummy variables into specication (17):
one dummy variable for whether a legislator is a Democrat or not (Democrat)38 and two
dummy variables that are equal to one if a Democrat or a Republican, respectively, is in
his last term (Last term, Democrat (Republican)). The results are reported in Table 5.
[Table 5. Test of the last-term e¤ect: Democrats versus Republicans]
We see that the last-term e¤ectis only signicant among Democrats. According to the
estimate reported in column 1, they bring about $17 per capita less back to their district
when they serve their last term. For education transfers, the estimate is slightly smaller
(column 2). As before, the last-term e¤ectis associated with discretionary transfers only
(columns 3 and 4). This is consistent with previous empirical research that suggests that
the Republican Party is more e¤ective at imposing party discipline then the Democrats.
In particular, Besley and Case (1995) nd among US state governors that the last-term
e¤ectis associated only with Democrats, not with Republicans.
4.2.3 District Characteristics
The transfers that legislative districts receive from the state budget are likely to depend
on district characteristics, as well as on the behavior of the districts representative. This
is particularly clear for spending items which are governed by pre-specied rules based on
demographic characteristics, such as the number of school-age children. Our estimations
compare earlier and later terms of the same legislator, and so district characteristics that
38Since we include legislator xed e¤ects, the direct e¤ect of party a¢ liation on the size of the average
district transfer (captured by the coe¢ cient on the Democrat dummy variable) is identied from legislators
who change their party while in o¢ ce. There are very few such cases, and the coe¢ cient on this variable
is insignicant.
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are xed over time are not contributing to the identication of the last-term e¤ect.39 Yet,
it is possible that districts evolve over time. Omitting district characteristics that change
over time and which a¤ect the allocation of pork-barrel spending may bias our estimate of
 if they are also correlated with the timing of a legislators last term. However, since the
timing of a legislators last term is determined by the year when the legislator was rst
elected into the House, it is not easy to think of reasons why such a relationship should
exist.
Nevertheless, to address this potential concern, we have constructed three time-varying
control variables: the proportion of the population over 65, the proportion of children of
school-age, and income per capita. These data are not available at the legislative district
level on a yearly basis, and so, we constructed them from county data using the same
geographical overlap technique that we used to estimate the district-specic transfers. We
add these control variables to equation (17). Although in this specication the last-term
e¤ecton total spending is no longer signicant, a statistically signicant negative last-
term e¤ectamong Democrats persists in education spending. In particular, we observe a
fall in education spending in the order of $12 per capita and this result continues to be
driven by discretionary rather than formula-based transfers [not reported].40
4.2.4 The Last-term E¤ectin the Absence of Term Limits
Our identication strategy builds on the fact that term limits force legislators to step down
and thus create exogenous variation in electoral incentives. One may ask, however, if we
could not simply study how the pattern of transfers change when a legislator enters his last
term as revealed ex post, without making use of term limits. If our model is interpreted
literally, then, without term limits, ine¤ective legislators of type H will be kicked out after
their rst (and only) term, while e¤ective legislators of type L will be re-elected forever
and, in the steady state they will be the only type in the legislature. Of course, in reality
we do see turnover even in legislatures that do not have term limits. This is so for at
39This statement is true since virtually no legislator change districts in our sample.
40The controls themselves are mostly signicant. Districts with more school-age children and lower
income per capita get more transfers.
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least two reasons. Firstly, voters may simply make mistakes and, within the context of our
model, re-elect legislators of type H or kick legislators of type L out of o¢ ce by accident.
Secondly, some e¤ective legislators of type L may leave o¢ ce voluntarily, either because of
age or for other private reasons. Turnover associated with random errors in voting will not
induce a last-term e¤ect. This is because legislators do not anticipate the outcome of the
election. Consequently, if all the turnover that we observe in a legislature without term
limits were due to such random events, there should not be any systematic patterns in
the ow of funds to a district across the life-cycle of the legislator who represents it. Any
last-term e¤ectmust, therefore, be due to voluntary retirement. In particular, within the
context of our model, a legislator of type L who (privately) decides not to run again will
behave as if he were a term-limited legislator. This will induce a fall in the pork owing
to his district during his last term in o¢ ce compared to his earlier terms. Adding this up,
we expect the last-term e¤ectto be weaker amongst legislators who do not face a binding
term limit compared to those who do.
We take this to the data in two ways. First, we estimate how pork-barrel spending
changes in the last term of legislators who serve in seven state Houses of Representatives
that do not have term limits. To do that, we choose seven states without term limits that
border the states in our sample (Alabama, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, North Dakota, New
Mexico, and Tennessee see appendix B for more detail), and construct the same type
of district-specic transfer data for these states as for our main sample. We then analyze
what happens to the transfer when the legislators in these Houses reach their last term
as revealed ex post. We use the same research design as above with legislator xed e¤ects
and state-specic time xed e¤ects. The independent variable (last term, ex post) is an
indicator variable that takes on the value of one during the last term served by a legislator.
Table 6 reports the results. Although the point estimate both for total (column 1) and for
discretionary (column 2) transfers are negative, neither are statistically signicant. The
same is true when we consider the two parties separately.
Second, we estimate the e¤ect of the last term among the legislators who step down
before they are forced to do so under the term limit laws in our main sample of the states
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that do have term limits. In this case, the independent variable (last term, ex post) takes
the value of one during the last term served by a legislator but we limit the sample to
the legislators who do not serve the maximum allowed number of terms (i.e., we exclude
any legislators who step down because of the term limit). The results, reported in columns
3 and 4 of table 6, again, show that there is no statistically signicant last-term e¤ect
among these legislators. This conclusion does not change if we allow the e¤ect to vary by
party.
We believe that these (negative) results illustrate the importance of using an exogenous
source of variation in electoral incentives, such as term limits, to estimate the impact of
electoral incentives on the behavior of legislators. The point is not only that this variation
is exogenous with respect of the legislative history of individual legislators, but also that
incentives change steeply at the point in time when the term limit binds and the reason
for stepping down is unambiguous.
[Table 6. A last-term e¤ectwithout term limits]
5 A New Test of the Law of 1/N
The Law of 1/N stating that the tendency to overspend is more pronounced in larger
legislatures has been subject to intense empirical scrutiny. Most investigations center
on a relationship between the number of districts (or the size of the decision making body
more generally) and total spending. The evidence from across US states, US cities, and
cross-national samples of countries is broadly supportive of the Law.41 A major challenge
with such tests is that the size of the legislature and government spending are likely to
be jointly determined by third factors; put di¤erently, it is often di¢ cult to nd su¢ cient
exogenous variation in the size of the legislature to have condence in the results (see the
41See e.g., Gilligan and Matsuska (1995), Bradbury and Cain (2001), Baqir (2002), Bradbury and
Stephenson (2003) and Primo (2006). Chen and Malhotra (2007) demonstrate how the e¤ect is conditional
on the level at which spending can be targeted. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) nds evidence that contradicts
the Law. He uses a discontinuity design and data from Swedish and Finish municipalities to estimate the
causal e¤ect of an increase in council size on total spending and nds that it is negative.
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discussion in Pettersson-Lidbom (2008)). Another limitation of these tests is their focus
on aggregate spending, despite the fact that the underlying theory of distributive politics
is concerned with how pork-barrel is allocated to particular geographically designated
constituencies. The implication of the Law of 1/N for aggregate spending is a by-product
of this process. Thus, tests that look at aggregate spending do not shed much light on
whether the underlying mechanism through which the total spending is inated is, in fact,
consistent with the distributive politics model. Doing so requires data on the amount of
pork that ow to particular districts.
Our data allow us to study such ows and to conduct a new test of the Law of 1/N
that explores the interaction between electoral incentives, the distribution of pork-barrel
spending and the size of the legislature. The test is inspired by the theory developed
in section 2. Recall that proposition 4 suggests that the last-term e¤ect is smaller in
absolute magnitude in states with a large legislature and that this dampening e¤ect is a
direct consequence of the Law of 1/N.
To take this prediction to the data, we explore the variation in the size of Houses
of Representatives in our sample, from Arizona with 30 districts to Missouri with 163
districts (see table 1). We augment the baseline specication from equation (17) with
an interaction term between the indicator variable for the last term of the term limited
legislators (last term) and the number of legislative districts (number of districts) and test
if the coe¢ cient on this interaction term is positive or not. This test is not plagued by the
same problems of endogeneity as the tests that use cross-state variation in the number of
districts to estimate the e¤ect on total state spending.42 The identication comes from the
interaction between a xed number of districts within each state and individual legislatures
being up against the term limit. As long as the (historical) choice of number of districts
is not correlated with some unobservable variable that is also correlated with whether a
particular legislator is up against the term limit, the estimate of the impact of the number
42Brooks et al. (2011) also propose an indirect test of the Law of 1/N. They study a sample of US cities
and make use of the fact that block grants from the federal government provide exogenous variation in
city revenues. They use this to study the e¤ect of council size on the responsiveness to extra revenues.
They nd indirect evidence of the Law of 1/N in that larger city councils tend to spend a larger fraction
of these block grants.
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of districts on the size of the last-term e¤ectis unbiased.
The results reported in table 7 show that the last-term e¤ectis smaller (less negative)
for larger legislatures. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive and statistically
signicant at the ten percent level when we look at total transfers per capita to a district
and at the ve percent level when we look at discretionary transfers alone.43 Once again,
we nd no e¤ect for non-discretionary transfers. This is consistent with our model and
provides strong, albeit indirect, evidence in support of the Law of 1/N. To get a sense
of the quantitative importance of House size on electoral incentives, we note that the
last-term e¤ecton discretionary transfers is equal to $21 per capita in the smallest of
the states, Arizona. In Ohio with a medium sized House of Representatives, the e¤ect is
approximately $9 per capita, while in Missouri with the largest number of districts, it is
almost zero.
[Table 7. The number of districts and the last-term e¤ect]
6 Conclusion
Most rational choice models of politics are predicated on the assumption that electoral
incentives matter for the behavior of politicians. This paper contributes fresh empirical
evidence that this basic assumption also applies at the level of individual legislators. It
studies the role of electoral incentives in a context with many legislators each representing
their own constituency. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature which focuses
on the relationship between a single politician and his electorate, and which shows that
electoral incentives typically improve welfare by alleviating the agency problem between
politicians and their voters. We argue that in the context of distributive politics, electoral
incentives acquire a di¤erent and somewhat darker role. They do so by inducing politicians
to pursue parochial interests and thus potentially aggravating the underlying common pool
problem.
43We have experimented with a number of alternative denitions of House size, including the number
of legislators, and with using district size instead of number of districts. Qualitatively, the results are
unchanged [not reported].
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We use the variation in electoral incentives generated by legislative term limits in
seven US states to estimate how these incentives a¤ect the allocation of the state budget.
Exploring a rich, new dataset on the ows of state funding to about 600 legislative district,
we nd strong evidence that legislators bring less pork back to their district when they
can no longer run for re-election. The magnitude of this last-term e¤ectis a 3.5 percent
fall in the total per capita transfer to the district during the legislators last term. Put
the other way around, this shows that electoral incentives encourage legislators to bring
extra pork-barrel spending to their district, thus aggravating the underlying common pool
problem of distributive politics.
The theoretical literature on legislative bargaining in the tradition of Baron and Fere-
john (1989) suggests that some legislators may be in a better position to bring pork-barrel
to their districts than others.44 We abstract from such di¤erences and our estimate of
last-term e¤ectis an average e¤ect of electoral incentives on pork-barrel spending across
all term-limited legislators. An important task for future research is to unpack this average
and to study the role of asymmetries in the power that legislators hold over the budget
allocation and the mechanisms through which such powers get bestowed.
One intriguing aspect of our results on the last-term e¤ectis the strong party di¤er-
ences: we nd that Democrats respond to electoral incentives in a way that Republicans
do not. One possible interpretation of this is that the Republican Party enforces stronger
party discipline. This raises a number of interesting questions for future research about
the mechanisms through which parties do that and the extent to which party discipline
help alleviate incentive and common pool problems.
The richness of our data allows us to provide a new test of the Law of 1/N. Most
existing tests focus on the relationship between the number of districts (or seats) and total
spending of the polity under consideration. Our theoretical model implies that the last-
term e¤ectshould be weaker in states with a large number of districts. We nd strong
evidence that this is also true empirically. We take this, not only as evidence consistent
44Knight (1995) provides evidence on this from the US Congress and political scientists studying state
budget processes (e.g., Thompson (1986), Gosling (1985), Crain and Muris (1995), and Ansolobehere and
Snyder (2006)) also report evidence consistent with this logic.
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with our particular model of distributive politics, term limits, and electoral incentives,
but, more generally, to add credence to the empirical relevance of the Law of 1/N.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1.
Notation With N districts and two types of legislators, there are N ! di¤erent compo-
sitions of the legislature. Let the set of all possible compositions be  with elements .
Let  k be the set of all possible congurations of the legislature consisting of the N   1
legislators other than legislator k and let a typical element be 0. We let k denote the
vote decision of voters in a district k represented by a rst-term legislator, with k = 1 if
he is re-elected and k = 0 if not. Last-term legislators are, by denition, never re-elected.
We can write the expected utility (as seen from the perspective of period t) of legislator
k for period t+ 1 onwards as
wk (T; k) + kM2 + E0 [ k(:)] +Wk: (18)
The expected utility consists of four terms. The rst term, wk (T; k) is the expected utility
associated with the pork delivered to his own district in period t + 1. This depends on
his type and on whether or not he is re-elected. The second term represents the ego-rent
for period t+ 1 which is only enjoyed if he is re-elected for the second and last term. The
third term, E0 [ k(:)], represents the expected tax cost associated with the pork-barrel
given to the N   1 other districts during period t + 1. The realized tax bill,  k(:), for
district k at time t + 1 is independent of whether legislator k is re-elected or not, but
depends on the conguration 0 of the rest of legislature (excluding district k) and on
what the equilibrium choices of these legislators are. Each conguration 0 arises with a
certain probability depending on  and we take the expectation over this. The nal term,
Wk, is the payo¤ from period t+ 2 onwards when legislator k is back in the private sector
irrespective of him being re-elected for a second term or not (the term limit binds and he
is forced to step down if elected for the second term).
Separating equilibria Assume that there is a ready supply of voters willing to run for
o¢ ce if called upon. We shall verify this assumption below. Let the candidate equilibrium
strategy for a rst-term legislator of type T be epTk and those for a last-term legislator pT .
The candidate equilibrium strategies for last-term legislators are optimal for the two
types of legislators since there is no re-election concern. Consider the rst-term legislator
in some district k. Fix the proposed equilibrium strategies of the N   1 other legislators,
some of whom will be in their rst term while others will be in their second, and collect
them in the vector p k. These induce a particular tax cost borne by district k,  k(
0; p k).
Firstly, suppose the rst-term legislator of district k is of type H. If he seeks re-election
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by mimicking the equilibrium strategy of rst-term legislators of type L (epLk ) his payo¤ is
y + v(epLk )  epLkN   aHc(epLk )   k(0; p k) +M1 (19)
+

M2 + wk (H; 1)  E0

 k(
0; p k)

+Wk

,
where wk (H; 1) = y + v(pH)   pHN   aHc(pH) because legislator k will be in o¢ ce for a
second term and will put in the minimum e¤ort to deliver pH at the personal cost aHc(pH).
If, on the other hand, he plays his rst-term equilibrium strategy epHk = pH he gets:
y + v(pH)  p
H
N
  aHc(pH)   k(0; p k) +M1 (20)
+

wk (H; 0)  E0

 k(
0; p k)

+Wk

,
where
wk (H; 0) = y + 

v(epLk )  epLkN

+ (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

(21)
because if he is replaced by a legislator of type L that legislator will be in his rst term and,
in equilibrium, deliver epLk , while if he is replaced by a legislator of type H, the equilibrium
amount of pork delivered to the district will be pH . Comparing and rearranging these two
equations yield the following restriction on epLk :
v(epLk )  epLkN   aLc(epLk )  (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

+ 

v(epLk )  epLkN

(22)
+(aH   aL)c(epLk ) M2
Denote the largest value of epLk at which this constraint binds by bpH . This is the same for
all districts because pH is independent of k. This condition will always be satised if it
holds for epLk = pH and in this case, legislators of type H have no incentive to mimic at all.
We rule this out by assuming that M2 > MH  aHc(pH). This guarantees that bpH > pH .
Secondly, consider a rst-term legislator of type L. If he plays the proposed equilibrium
strategy, epLk , to get re-elected, then he gets
y + v(epLk )  epLkN   aLc(epLk )   k(0; p k) +M1 (23)
+

M2 + wk (L; 1)  E0

 k(
0; p k)

+Wk

,
where wk (L; 1) = y+ v(pL)  pLN   aLc(pL). If, on the other hand, he deviates and puts in
the minimum e¤ort required to deliver pL in his rst term with the consequence that he
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is not re-elected, he gets
y + v(pL)  p
L
N
  aLc(pL)   k(0; p k) +M1 (24)
+

wk (L; 0) + E0

 k(
0; p k)

+Wk

,
where
wk (L; 0) = y + 

v(pL)  p
L
N

+ (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

(25)
because the replacement legislator is expected to deliver pH if he is of type H and pL if he
is of type L (and, therefore, is conjectured to deviate).
Comparing and rearranging these two equations yield the following restriction on epLk :
v(epLk )  epLkN   aLc(epLk )  (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

(26)
+

v(pL)  p
L
N

 M2
We denote the largest value of epLk at which this constraint binds by bpL which we note is
the same for all districts. If the second term ego-rent is too low, this condition may fail for
all epLk and legislators of type L prefer not to run again. To ensure that legislators of type
L always want to seek re-election if they could achieve this by putting in the minimum
amount of e¤ort and deliver pL, we assume that M2 > ML where
ML  aLc(pL) + (1  )

(v(pH)  p
H
N
)  (v  pL  pL
N
)

: (27)
This guarantees that bpL > pL. To establish that bpL > bpH , we can calculate the di¤erence
between the right-hand sides of inequalities (26) and (22):


v(pL)  p
L
N

  

v(epLk )  epLkN

   aH   aL c(epLk ) < 0 (28)
for M2 > ML. We note that v(epLk )   epLkN   aLc(epLk ) is decreasing in epLk for epLk  pL. As
a consequence all epLk 2 bpH ; bpL will generate separation. Given that, Bayes rule requires
that the voters of district k believe that their incumbent is of type L if pk = epLk and of
type H if pk = pH . It is, therefore, a best response for voters in district k to re-elect if
pk = epLk and not to re-elect if pk = pH .
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Equilibrium Renements We can reduce the set of separating equilibria to a singleton
if we impose the restriction known as elimination of weakly dominated strategies on voters
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. By dominated we mean deviations that yield a lower overall
payo¤ to a legislator than his equilibrium payo¤ irrespective of how he privately thinks
voters will revise their beliefs after such a deviation. It is clear that all pk in
bpH ; bpL are
dominated for type H and so, it is reasonable to suppose that voters, should they observe a
deviation within this range, would conclude that the legislator behind the deviation could
not have been of type H. With this restriction in place, a rst-term legislator of type L can
pick his most-preferred separating strategy from the set
bpH ; bpL, i.e., the spending level
that is least costly: maxfbpH ; pLg. This is the unique undominated separating equilibrium.
The additional restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that we need is that any deviation
to a pk =2
bpH ; bpL must in the eyes of voters have been generated by type H.
Signalling or separating equilibrium Whether the undominated separating equilib-
rium is a signalling or screening equilibrium depends on whether or not condition (22)
holds at epLk = pL. If it does, then maxfbpH ; pLg = pL and the screening equilibrium ap-
plies; if not, then maxfbpH ; pLg = bpH and the signalling equilibrium applies. Evaluating
condition (22) at epLk = pL, we see that it does not bind for M2 > MS where MS is dened
as
MS  aHc(pL) + (1  )

(v(pH)  p
H
N
)  (v  pL  pL
N
)

: (29)
Clearly, MS > max fML;MHg because aH > aL and because pL > pH . So for M2 > MS,epLk = bpH and for M2 2 [max fML;MHg ;MS], epLk = pL. We note that if M is larger than
My  aHc(y) + (1  )

(v(pH)  p
H
N
)  (v (y)  y
N
)

> MS (30)
then it is impossible within the budget for individual legislators of type L to signal their
type and the separating equilibria cannot exist. Consequently, we impose that M2 < My.
Voluntary supply of candidates We need to verify that voters want to run for o¢ ce.
We assume that they do not learn their type until they are in o¢ ce. As a consequence, the
decision to accept the call to run is based on a comparison between the expected utility
of running (and selecting the type-specic equilibrium e¤ort levels) and not running. The
assumption that M2  max fML;MHg is su¢ cient to ensure that all types of legislators
are willing to run for a second term, conditional on having accepted to serve the rst. So,
we can focus on nding a condition on the rst-term ego-rent that is su¢ cient to induce
a randomly selected citizen to accept to run. Dene the expected per-period utility of a
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voter in district k who is not running as:
Eu(pk) = (1  )

v(pH)  p
H
N

+ 

v(epLk )  epLkN

: (31)
Now, consider a voter who before he knows his type as a legislator is called upon to run
in an open race against another randomly chosen voter from his district. If he runs, (and
plays the type-specic equilibrium strategy), he wins with probability 1
2
and his expected
utility is
(1  )

1
2

v(pH)  p
H
N
  aHc(pH) +M1

+
1
2
Eu(pk)

(32)
+

1
2

v(epLk )  epLkN   aLc(epLk ) +M1

+
1
2
Eu(pk)

: (33)
If does not run, he expects someone else to run and his payo¤ is simply Eu(pk). Evaluating
the di¤erence between these two payo¤s at epLk = y, we conclude that
M1 > (1  ) aHc(pH) + aLc(y) (34)
is su¢ cient to ensure that any randomly selected citizen will accept the call to run.
Proof of proposition 4. We want to evaluate the sign of
dbpH
dN
  dp
L
dN
: (35)
We note that dp
L
dN
=   1
D1
where D1 = N2(v00(pL)   aLc00(pL). Total di¤erentiation of
equation (22) yields
dbpH
dN
=
aHc0(pH)dp
H
dN
+ 1
N2
(pH   bpH)
v0(bpH)  1
N
  aHc0(bpH)
1 
: (36)
The denominator is negative because bpH > pH . The rst term of the nominator is positive,
while the second term is negative. We can rewrite the denominator, which we shall refer
to as D2, as
D2 = v
0(bpH)  1
N
  a
Hc0(bpH)
1   (37)
= v0(bpH)  v0(pH) + aHc0(pH)  aHc0(bpH)  aHc0(bpH)
1  
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since pH by denition satises v0(pH)  aHc0(pH)  1
N
= 0. Substituting this into equation
(35) gives
dbpH
dN
  dp
L
dN
=
1
D2D1

aHc0(pH)
dpH
dN
D1 +
1
N2
(pH   bpH)D1 +D2 : (38)
A su¢ cient condition for this to be negative is that 1
N2
(pH   bpH)D1+D2  0. Expanding
this expression using the denitions of D1 and D2 gives
 (bpH   pH)(v00(pL)  aLc00(pL)) + (39)
v0(bpH)  v0(pH) + aHc0(pH)  aHc0(bpH)  aHc0(bpH)
1  
=
 (bpH   pH)v00(pL) +  v0(bpH)  v0(pH)
+aH
 
(bpH   pH)c00(pL)   c0(bpH)  c0(pH
 a
Hc0(bpH)
1   + (bpH   pH)  aL   aH c00(pL):
Under the assumption that the v000 = 0 and c000 = 0, this reduces to
 a
Hc0(bpH)
1   + (bpH   pH)  aL   aH c00(pL) < 0 (40)
and we conclude that a su¢ cient condition for dbpH
dN
  dpL
dN
< 0 is that v000 = 0 and c000 = 0.
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Appendix B: Data
This appendix provides a detailed description of the sources of our dataset and how we
constructed it from these sources. The description follows this outline:
B1. List of data sources
B2. Transfers
B3. Legislators
B4. Matching local governments to geographical entities
B5. Matching transfers to representatives
B6. Controls
B7. States without term limits
B1. List of data sources
1. Transfers from the state budget to local government units.
(a) Counties, municipalities, townships and special districts: US Census Bureau,
State and Local Government Finances (SLGF), Individual Unit Files, 1992
2006 (http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/).
(b) School districts: US Census Bureau, Public Elementary-Secondary Education
Finance Data (PESEF), 19922006 (http://www.census.gov/govs/school/).
2. Legislators: The State Elections Database (Carsey et al. (2008)) supplemented
by state legislative rosters, election records and almanacs of US state governments
(either available on-line or received by approaching state legislatures).
3. Term limits: National Conference of State Legislatures (http://www.ncsl.org/).
4. Control variables: US Census Bureau, USA Counties (http://censtats.census.gov
/usa/usa.shtml).
5. Geographical coverage of local government units:
(a) Counties, municipalities and townships: US Census Bureau, State and Local
Government Finances (SLGF), Directory Information Files, 19922006 (http://www.census.gov
/govs/estimate/) and US Census Bureau, Government Integrated Directory,
1992, 1997 and 2002 (http://www.census.gov/govs/go /historical_data.html).
(b) Special districts: US Census Bureau, 2002 Census of Governments, Government
Organization Public Use Files (http://www.census.gov/govs/www /02PubUse-
doc_GovOrg.html).
6. Boundary information: US Census Bureau, 2007, TIGER/Line Shape les (http://www.census.gov
/geo/www/tiger/).
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7. Redistricting information: National Conference of State Legislatures (http://www.ncsl.org/)
and The United States Elections Project (http://elections.gmu.edu), and TIGER
data (see 6 above).
B2. Transfers
We use the so-called local government accountsto identify recipients of state funds and
the amounts they get from state budgets. These data are collected by the US Census
Bureau and come from two sources: The State and Local Government Finance (SLGF)
database and the Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance (PESEF) database.
The SLGF Individual Unit Filescontain the annual accounts of the following local
government units: counties, municipalities, townships, school districts, and special dis-
tricts (divisions established for provision of a particular kind of public service, e.g. water
districts, library districts, housing development agencies etc.).45 We take the data on coun-
ties, municipalities, townships and special districts from the SLGF, and the data on school
districts from the PESEF, for reasons we explain below.
From the SLGF databases revenue accounts of local government units, we identify
the moneys each unit received from the state budget by the line item intergovernmental
revenue from state governments(item codes beginning with C). These are disaggregated
into broad categories of services for which the transfers are intended: education, health and
hospitals, highways, housing and community development, public welfare, utilities (water
supply, gas supply, electric power, sewerage), public mass transit systems, general local
government support, and all other(US Census Bureau (2006)). Although the Census
classication of government nances changes during our sample period, the categories of
interest for our study are not a¤ected.46
The SLGF database contains a census of all local government units in 1992, 1997,
and 2002. In other years, the SLGF database contains a sample of the local government
units. We used the data from the three census years to contrast the local governments that
are included in the sample years only to the entire population of local government units.
This exercise shows that, although the sampled units, on average, account for only 10%
of all local governments, they receive over 80% of all state transfers. This fact alleviates
potential concerns regarding the e¤ect of a smaller sample size in non-census years.
Even though school districts are included in the SLGF database, the source of the data
on transfers to school districts is the Public ElementarySecondary Education Finance
(PESEF) database. We prefer this source for two reasons. First, the PESEF database
contains information on the entire population of school districts each year and thus has
a more complete coverage than the SLGF database. Second, the PESEF database disag-
gregates state support for education. The line items we use are those under the headings
45The Census refers to school and special districts as special-purpose governments
http://www.census.gov/govs/go/population_of_interest.html.
46Although according to the Census Classication Manuals categories C28, C47 and C67 are not in use
after 1988, we found a handful of observations using these codes in the data. We disregarded these.
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Revenue from state sourcesand State payments on behalf of local education agency.
We separate one category Revenue from state sources: General Formula Assistance
from the rest and refer to it as formula spending, while we aggregate the remaining line
items into the category non-formula spending.
The transfer data are extracted from the individual Census les for each year and
combined it into one large dataset. We (successfully) conducted a number of consistency
checks, aggregating the transfers and comparing them to the aggregate data from other
Census sources and to the total revenues and spending of local governments.
We deate all transfer data by the annual CPI published by Bureau of Labour Statistics
(using their base of 1982-84). To calculate per capita transfers in a given year and district,
we took each districts population to be equal to the Census Bureaus state population
estimate for that year divided by the number of house districts in the state. The justication
for this is the legal requirement that all legislative districts must have the same number
of people in them.
B3. Legislators
The data on state representatives are constructed from the State Elections Database col-
lected by Carsey et al. (2008). We transform the biannual observations on elections (and
in case of Louisiana, one observation every four years) into an annual dataset containing
a representative for each district for each year. From these data (which go back to 1968),
we calculate the number of terms that each legislator have served at any given point in
time. Given each states term limit laws, we then calculate the year when each legislator
cannot run for re-election. In doing so, we take account of partial terms resulting from
special elections and service interruptions. We follow the statesrules on how these should
be treated, which di¤er across states.
We cleaned the States Elections Database to ensure that 1) the same legislator is
always referred to by exactly the same name, 2) di¤erent legislators are referred to by
di¤erent names, and 3) there are no missing data. We lled in the missing data and
resolved any ambiguities in the dataset using election records, legislative rosters and state
government almanacs of individual states, either from the relevant states o¢ cial web sites
or by contacting them directly.
The key variable that enabled us to match legislators to pork-barrel spending (calcu-
lated using legislative district boundaries from the TIGER database) is the district number.
In the seven states in our main sample, the district numbering system in the State Elec-
tions Database and in the TIGER database is the same. Two states have multiple member
districts (Arizona and South Dakota). For these, we matched each representative to the
total transfer received by the district. We take this into account by clustering the standard
errors in our estimations at district-year level.
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B4. Matching local government units to geographical entities
In order to match the location of a recipient of state funding to the legislative district in
which it is situated, we need to know which geographical area is covered by each local
government unit. Once identied, we assume that the benets of the state transfers are
conned to this area (this assumption is discussed in section 3). In case of counties, munic-
ipalities and townships this was a straightforward task since the area served by these local
governments correspond to the relevant geographical divisions. The data on geographical
borders of these divisions, as well as for school districts, are available from the US Census
Bureau in the form of TIGER shape les. However, no data are available on the boundaries
of special districts. So, we match the special districts to the geographical areas they cover
using two approaches. First, for some special districts, the Government Organization 2002
File provides information on whether special district boundaries coincide with a) a county,
b) a municipality or a township, c) lie entirely within a county or d) cover more than one
county (with other counties listed). We match these special districts to the Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard (FIPS) codes accordingly. Unable to identify boundaries for
category c), we dropped these special districts from the sample. Second, for the majority
of special districts that did not have any information on the area they serve in the Govern-
ment Organization 2002 File, we tried to infer their geographical location from the name.
For example, Grundy County Rural Fire Protection Districtwe classied as providing
services to Grundy County. Using both of these methods we are able to locate just under
60% of the 4,867 special districts covered by the SLGF database.
Having identied geographical service areas, we then proceed to match the local gov-
ernment units to the boundaries for the respective geographical units contained in the
TIGER database. In order to complete this matching, we had to go through one more
step. This is because the SLGF Individual Unit Files identify each local government unit
using a special Census code, while the TIGER database uses Federal Information Process-
ing Standard (FIPS) codes. We matched the special Census code to the FIPS code using
the SLGF Directory Information Files and the Censuss Government Integrated Direc-
tory.47 This additional step was not necessary for school districts since they have the same
identier in the TIGER and PESEF database. For some years, a few school districts in
the PESEF database do not have an identication code; we interpolated those from other
years.
We match the ve types of local government units (counties, municipalities, townships,
special districts, and school districts) to the geographical boundaries of the area that they
serve using TIGER 2007 shape les. We use the shape les based on Census 2000 data.
Whilst we are able to match most of the local government units in this way, there were
some for which no TIGER boundary data were available. More specically, we match all
counties, virtually all municipalities, and all school districts. However, TIGER data do not
contain any of the township boundaries, and so we could not match townships and special
districts that serve townships. Dropping townships and special districts that we cannot
47We checked to see that virtually no geographical entities changed their FIPS codes throughout out
sample period.
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match from the sample reduces the number of local government units by 40%. These units,
however, account for a very small fraction of total state transfers and we can match 98%
of all non-school district transfers (and 100% of school district transfers).
B5. Matching transfers to representatives
To identify the House district that benets from particular state transfers, we matched the
geographical boundaries of the local government units to the geographical boundaries of
state House districts. We, then, calculate the total transfer received by a House district as
the sum of all transfers received by local government units located in it. Below we describe
this in more detail, discussing several complications.
Overlaps. Geographical boundaries for areas served by local government units and
for state legislative districts are available in the TIGER 2007 shape les. Each boundary is
a polygon whose location on the map is described by several points and their coordinates.
We input these into software which calculates the area overlap between each local recipient
of state money and each state House district. Smaller local government units - small and
medium sized municipalities and the special districts which serve them - typically lie within
one legislative district in their entirety. In such cases, it is straightforward to compute the
transfers that the district receives from state budget as the sum of the transfers to these
local government units. On the other hand, larger local government units, e.g., school
districts and counties, often straddle two or more legislative districts. In such cases, we
attribute a share of the transfers to each legislative district. The share is equal to the
percentage area overlap between the jurisdiction of each local government unit and the
legislative district.48 This provides an estimate of the size of the transfer from the state
budget allocated to each legislative district in each year.
Fiscal years. Both the SLGF and the PESEF database report annual data for the end
of a scal year rather than by calendar year. In all seven states in the sample, the scal year
starts in July; so, for example, the 2002 SLGF database, provides scal information for the
period from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002. We allocate state transfers to the representative
who is in o¢ ce when the appropriate budget is drafted. For example, the 2002 SLGF data
is matched to legislators who are in o¢ ce in 2001.49 So unlike the Census, in this paper,
2001 refers to scal year July 1, 2001 to June 20, 2002 and so on.
Redistricting. The boundaries of state legislative districts get redrawn once every ten
48This is equivalent to assuming that benets from the state transfers are uniformly distributed across
the local geographical entity that receives the funds (discussed in section 3). We checked our ndings for
robustness by re-estimating the regressions using an alternative weighting by the population of the overlap
for the cases where a local government straddles the border of a legislative district. We continue to nd
that there is a signicant negative last term e¤ectin education spending, and it is due to the behavior
of the Democrats.
49In our sample ve states have annual budgets, and two (Arizona and Ohio) have (some) biannual
budgets. In the latter two states, House elections are held for all districts on the same date and the bian-
nual budget is always drafted in the rst year after the elections (i.e., in the rst year of a representatives
two-year term), and so, the same matching algorithm applies to them.
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years, following the decennial Census.50 During our sample period, this occurs once, after
the year 2000 Census. We need to take this into account because we use these boundaries
to match the local government units to House districts. We create separate matches
for the pre- and post-redistricting legislative boundaries.51 In all states in the sample,
except Louisiana, the rst election after redistricting is held at the end of 2002 with
the legislators taking o¢ ce in January 2003. Thus, all legislators who are in o¢ ce up
to 2002 are matched to transfers constructed using pre-redistricting boundaries; while
post-redistricting boundaries are used to construct transfers for the legislators who are in
o¢ ce from 2003 onwards (i.e., beginning with the scal year July 1, 2003-June 30, 2004).
In Louisiana, the rst election using post-redistricting district boundaries is at the end
of 2003, and so, the representatives who hold o¢ ce from 2004 onwards are matched to
transfers calculated using the boundaries of the new districts.
B6. Controls
Annual data on characteristics of legislative districts does not exist. We construct estimates
using annual data on counties from the US Census Bureau, USA Counties database and a
matching procedure similar to the one we used to compute district-specic transfers. For
example, to estimate the number of citizens over 65 years of age in a legislative district,
we rst identify all the counties that (party or wholly) lie in the district. We, then, take
a weighted sum of the counties population of over 65 years olds where each countys
weight is the share of its area that lies in the legislative district of interest. We constructed
estimates of the school-age population and income per capita in the same way.
B7. States without term limits
Alongside the seven states with term limits that comprise our main sample, we construct a
similar dataset for seven states without term limits. We use these data for the estimations
reported in table 7 (columns 1 and 2). Our choice of states for this group is constrained by
two requirements: 1) they should never have had term limits (this narrows the possibilities
down to 29 states) and 2) the TIGER database must contain data on legislative boundaries
(this further reduces the possibilities down to 22). To focus on states that are as comparable
as possible to the states with term limits in our main sample, we select seven states from
the same regions and require within each region that the selected state borders at least
one of the states with term limits in our sample. The sample of states with term limits
includes three states in the Midwest (Ohio, Missouri and South Dakota), two in the South
(Louisiana and Oklahoma), and two in the West (Arizona and Colorado). So, for the
comparison sample, we select four states in the Midwest (Illinois, North Dakota, Kansas
50This is required by law to ensure that all districts have an equal number of people.
51TIGER 2007 contains shape les for both pre- and post-redistricting legislative boundaries for the
states in the sample.
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and Iowa), two states from the South (Alabama and Tennessee) and one state from the
West (New Mexico). Table B1 provides a brief summary of these data.
<Table B1. States without term limits>
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Table 1.   State Houses of Representatives and term limits in the seven states 
State  
Number 
of 
legislators  
Number 
of 
districts 
Democrats, 
share of 
total  
Year of first 
election under 
TL 
Maximum 
allowed 
service under 
TL (years) 
Year term 
limits 
bind* 
Term 
limited 
legislators 
Average 
service 
before TL 
Average 
service 
after TL 
Arizona 174 30 0.37 1992 8 2000 27 7.7 5.6 
Colorado 175 65 0.41 1990 8 1998 41 8.5 6.4 
Louisiana  210 105 0.74 1995 12 2007 49 15.1 n/a 
Missouri 396 163 0.53 1994 8 2002 87 10.9 8.9** 
Ohio 236 99 0.42 1992 8 2000 67 12.3 6.6 
Oklahoma 184 101 0.60 1992 12 2004 29 13.6 n/a 
South 
Dakota 199 35 0.32 1992 8 2000 28 8.3 5.8 
Entire 
sample 1,574 598         328 11.7 6.3 
*The year when the first set of term-limited legislators cannot run again ** This is greater than 8 due to provisions for special elections in Missouri. 
TL = term limits  
Table 2. Total transfers from the state budget to legislative districts 
Per capita 1984 US$ 
State  Mean Standard deviation N Share of transfers in 
total state spending 
per capita 
Arizona 557 473 720 0.36 
Colorado 426 364 780 0.28 
Louisiana  384 386 1,470 0.21 
Missouri 347 164 1,956 0.23 
Ohio 498 177 1,188 0.28 
Oklahoma 398 220 1,212 0.26 
South Dakota 262 160 840 0.17 
Total 400 294 8,166 0.26 
Note: N is equal to number of districts time the number of years, except for Arizona and South Dakota, where  
 there are two representatives per district N is two times number of districts times years. The sample period is 
1993-2004, except for Louisiana where the period is 1992-2005. 
 
Table 3.  Breakdown of transfers to legislative districts by transfer type 
Per capita 1984 US$ 
Type Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min1 Max Share of transfers 
in total state 
spending on this 
activity 
Discretionary transfers, total 142 128 2 2,023 
Education, non-formula 70 70 0 686 0.83 
Local government support 20 50 0 749 1 
Highways 21 26 0 368 0.14 
Health 8 21 0 259 0.07 
Housing 1 8 0 441 0.21 
Transit  1 2 0 94 0.34 
Other 21 41 0 1,341 n/a 
Non-discretionary transfers, total 258 206 0 1,968 
Education, formula 234 175 0 1,740 0.83 
Welfare 25 73 0 1,226 0.07 
  Utilities 0.6 4 0 91 0.01 
Notes: N=8,166. 1 zero transfers were received in several districts in Oklahoma in 1993. 
2 share of all primary & secondary education transfers in total state spending on primary & secondary education. 
(separate data on total formula spending are not available) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Test of the 'last-term effect': The main results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                         Transfers per capita 
Total Education Discretionary 
Non-
discretionary 
Last term -14.4* -9.8* -9.5* -5.0 
(6.6) (4.2) (4.2) (4.2) 
N 8,166 8,166 8,166 8,166 
          
Note: Estimates include legislator fixed effects and state-specific year effects. Robust in standard errors parentheses, 
clustered at district-year level. N  is the number of observations. 
** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level, + significant at 10% level.  
           
 
 Table 5. Test of the 'last-term effect': Democrats versus Republicans 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Education Discretionary Non-discretionary 
Last term, Democrats -17.3* -15.6** -13.1** -4.2 
(7.5) (5.6) (5.3) (5.1) 
Last term, Republicans -11.9 -4.9 -6.5 -5.5 
(7.6) (4.7) (4.3) (4.6) 
Democrat 5.4 -3.1 -3.0 8.4 
(16.2) (14.4) (7.5) (12.6) 
N 8,166 8,166 8,166 8,166 
          
Note: Estimates include legislator fixed effects and state-specific year effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at district-year level. N is the number of observations. 
** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level, + significant at 10% level 
 
Table 6.  The ‘last-term effect’ without term limits 
States without term limits States with term limits 
  All legislators Legislators who leave before TL binds 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Total 
transfers Discretionary transfers 
Total 
transfers Discretionary transfers 
Last term, ex-post -2.6 -0.8 -3.9 -3.0 
(3.1) (2.3) (4.9) (2.8) 
N 8,473 8,473 5,115 5,115 
          
Note: Estimates include legislator fixed effects and state-specific year effects. TL=term limits. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district-year level. N is number of observations. 
** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level, + significant at 10% level
 
  
Table 7.  The number of districts and the 'last-term effect' 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Total 
transfers 
Discretionary 
transfers 
Non-
discretionary 
transfers 
Last term -38.2* -26.5** -11.7 
(17.3) (9.3) (9.7) 
Last term*Number of 
districts 0.26+ 0.18* 0.07 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.08) 
N 8,166 8,166 8,166 
        
Notes: Estimates include legislator fixed effects and state-specific year effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district-year level 
** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level, + significant at 10% level 
N is the number of observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B1.  States without term limits 
State  Mean transfers 
per capita 
Number of 
districts 
Sample years 
Alabama 435 105 1995-2005 
Iowa 472 100 1993-2004 
Illinois 460 118 1993-2004 
Kansas 539 125 1993-2004 
North Dakota 389 49/47* 1993-2004 
New Mexico 665 70 1993-2004 
Tennessee 543 99 1993-2004 
Average 495     
* before/after redistricting following 2000 Census 
 
 
Figure 1: Identification example
District A
Stanley Blanche
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
District B
Mitch Stella
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
